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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, civil society in Russia has found itself more and more under state pressure. 
In 2012, the State Duma adopted a law requiring NGOs to register as ‘foreign agents’ if they 
accept foreign funding - a term which in Russia is interpreted as ‘spy’.1 From May 2014 on, 
the Ministry of Justice can unilaterally list organizations as ‘foreign agents’ and plan 
unscheduled audits. Bloggers have come under pressure from a law that requires any website 
with more than 3000 visitors per day to be responsible for the ‘accuracy of all information 
published’.2 Freedom of assembly was restricted, the police was given more rights to use 
violence, and journalists are now required to be clearly identifiable during public events. 
Several websites were blocked, and pressure on critical media outlets such as radio station Ekho 
Moskvy and independent television channel Dozhd increased.3 
Despite the fact that Russia’s regime has become more authoritarian, it differs from some 
other authoritarian regimes, such as China’s, in that its law formally guarantees freedom of 
speech, multiparty democracy and rule of law.4 Although these values exist in name only, the 
Russian government tries to keep up the façade of being a more or less ‘normal’ democracy, 
while at the same time controlling the mechanisms of the state in order to extract rents from 
it.5 In order to maintain the façade (both externally and domestically), the Russian government 
allows a certain degree of freedom, while at the same time exerting control over the public 
arena by embarking on propaganda campaigns to confuse audiences 6  and setting up pro-
Kremlin organizations to ‘fill the public sphere’.7 In this way, the regime has constructed a 
public sphere itself, albeit highly controlled. 
Research on civil society in contemporary Russia leads to contradictory observations, 
depending on the focus and theoretical framework. On the one hand, scholars describe civil 
society as weak and underdeveloped.8 According to the Levada Centre, 37% of the adult 
Russian population do not read newspapers and 46% do not read books. 9  Television is 
dominated by trivia, and striving for financial success is deemed more important than 
                                                 
1 Human Rights Watch, "Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups. The Battle Chronicle." 
2 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, "Civic Freedom Monitor: Russia." 
3 R. Orttung, "Why Has Putin Spared Ekho Moskvy? (Op-Ed)," The Moscow Times 2015. 
4 K.R. Brady, "The Façade of Russian Democracy:Examining the Quality and Truth of Democracy in the 
Russian Federation" (San Jose State University, 2012). 
5 M. Galeotti in ‘In Moscow's Shadows’, 2015. 
6 P. Pomerantsev in ‘Politico’, 2015. 
7 G.B. Robertson, "Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society, and the Regime in Putin's Russia," Slavic Review 
68, no. 3 (2009): 542. 
8 S. Henderson, "Civil society is alive in Russia but it is not well." OSU Center for the Humanities.  
9 E. Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin's Russia (London 2013), 53. 
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engagement in public activity.10 On the other hand, despite the weak position of civil society 
Russia, there are also signs of more active citizen participation in the public sphere. The 
Bolotnaya protests of 2011 were the largest since the end of the Soviet era,11 and a clear sign 
that civil society was very much alive. Dr. Elena Chebankova, an expert in the field of civil 
society in Russia, sees the public rallies that appeared in Russia in 2014 after the Maidan events 
in Ukraine as a positive sign: large numbers of ordinary Russians showed political engagement 
by joining rallies in support of Crimea and the Donbas.12 Although, without doubt, this activity 
was fueled by the propaganda campaign on Russian TV channels, she sees the degree of 
engagement on itself as a positive development. 
Very much connected to the question of the strength or weakness of Russian civil society is 
the issue of how civil society should be characterized. Important developments within civil 
society often happen in the “invisible realm of social consciousness”13 and are difficult to 
identify. In her account on Russian civil society in Putin’s Russia (2012), Chebankova explores 
three notions of civil society to assess the civil landscape. The first conceptualization (or 
‘realm’ in Chebankova’s terms) of civil society consists of associational life, i.e. voluntary 
organizations, associations, clubs and networks. This conceptualization of civil society is not 
necessarily political, but forms a social environment that exists between the state and the 
individual. Although this conceptualization is relatively easy to study because of its concrete 
nature, it largely ignores the ideological, ‘mental’ dimension. As I wrote before, it is unclear 
which associations should be considered part of civil society, and to which extend they ought 
to be independent to be considered as such. For instance, the trucker actions in late 2015 against 
the road tax for heavy trucks are a clear example of civic action. However, the actions were 
directed against something very specific that had very clear effects on the truckers’ life and 
financial situation, and (at the time of writing) do not have a real ideological dimension.14 As 
such, it is unclear whether the protests are a sign of a vibrant civil society. 
When it comes to the invisible, ‘mental’ and ideological dimension, Chebankova’s second 
conceptualization offers a better view. This conceptualization focuses on the realm of ideas, 
and it views civil society as ‘a kind of society’ that pursues norms, beliefs and values. In this 
view, civil society is a means by which individuals can realize their ideas of a morally ‘good’ 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 54. 
11 B. Whitmore, "The Power Vertical Podcast: Putin's Protest Problem," RFE/RL  (2015). 
12  E. Chebankova, "Grassroots movements in Putin's Russia: A ray of hope for civil society?," Cicero 
Foundation Great Debate Paper 15, no. 7 (2015): 10. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 B. Whitmore. 
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life. Civil rights and environmental movements are, in this view, clear examples of civil 
society. The third conceptualization views civil society as a ‘public sphere’, in which ideas and 
ideologies can be exchanged, critical discussion and assessment can take place, and opinions 
are formed. This idea of civil society finds its realization in newspapers, independent radio 
stations and internet. In this view, it is paramount that the public sphere be independent from 
state or private interests. As Habermas noted, both private interests (through market mechanics) 
and state interests (through force) can ‘hijack’ the public sphere and manipulate public 
opinion.15 The media campaign of the Kremlin in 2014 is a clear example: although it had 
widespread mobilization as its effect, it is difficult to view it as ‘civil society’ in the third sense, 
since the influence of the state media (most markedly television) on public opinion was 
enormous. A similar problem occurs when assessing organizations such as Nashi, a pro-
Kremlin youth organization. Although opinion forming, interaction and the pursuit of 
ideological goals are clearly present, it is difficult to classify these organizations as signs of a 
vibrant civil society, due to their forced character. But even though these organizations were 
set up by the government, the influence that this phenomenon exerts on society is very real. 
Apart from the difficulties regarding the definition of civil society, there are big differences 
between large cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, and smaller cities and rural parts of 
the country. Thirty percent of the Russian population lives in cities with more than half a 
million inhabitants – usually, those cities are characterized by a more vivid cultural life and a 
younger population (e.g. in Tomsk, almost one-fifth of the population consists of students) and 
more independent news channels. However, these cities are not representative for the whole 
country. Natalia Zubarevich, an specialists in the economy of the Russian regions, distinguishes 
‘four Russia’s’. The ‘first Russia’ is the Russia of the big cities, such as Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg. The ‘second Russia’ consists of smaller cities in which ‘blue-collar workers’, 
working in dated Soviet-style industries, constitute the bigger part of the population. The ‘third 
Russia’ consists of the countryside, and the fourth Russia consists of the most underdeveloped 
regions of Russia, such as Tuva and the Northern Caucasus.16 The 2011-2013 protests were 
largely concentrated in the first Russia, which is one of the reasons they failed; the protests of 
Bolotnaya were largely political, and did not connect to earlier protests (2005-2011), which 
were mainly focused on socio-economic issues.17 The fact that there is a big difference between 
                                                 
15 E. Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin's Russia, 6. 
16 N. Zubarevič, "Četyre Rossii," Vedomosti 2011. 
17 I. Busygina and M. Filippov, "The Calculus of Non-Protest in Russia: Redistributive Expectations from 
Political Reforms," Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 2 (2015): 210. 
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the four Russia’s when it comes to socio-economic situation and reasons for protests, points at 
different mechanisms in different regions Russia. Even though research addressing Russian 
civil society in national terms can be very valuable, since there are many factors (television, 
national newspapers) that apply to the whole country, such research does not provide very 
concrete insights in the workings of civil society on a sub-national scale.  
There are several studies regarding civil society on a local scale in Russia. Belokurova and 
Vorobyov assessed local participation in current-day Russia. The authors distinguish between 
different kinds of NGOs and describe the way they interact with the local government.18 The 
study gives a basis on which it is possible to study local civil society in more detail, but the 
authors do not give concrete examples from Russian cities or regions or an in-depth view into 
the mechanisms of local civil society. Lankina and Voznaya presented relatively recent data on 
protest trends in different regions of Russia. Although the authors do not delve deeply into any 
specific regions or cities, their research confirms the exclusiveness of Moscow and (to a lesser 
extent) Saint-Petersburg: In the period 2007-2012, Moscow City was the region with by far the 
highest number of protests (1428 in total). Second comes St. Petersburg, with 520 protests 
(about three times fewer than in Moscow), and the third city in the list, Samara, experienced 
only 210 protests. After that, the curve becomes less steep with four regions experiencing 
between 100 and 150 protests.19 
Although the collected data on protests are certainly insightful, a more profound assessment 
of civil organizations in the form of a case study is necessary to really understand how civil 
society functions in regions of Russia outside Moscow or Saint-Petersburg. The city of Tolyatti, 
in the Samara oblast’, is a good candidate for such a case study. The city has a population of 
about 700.000 inhabitants, but despite the large population, Zubarevich classified this city as 
part of the ‘second Russia’: it is an industrial city with a population of blue-collar workers. The 
city has considerable industrial importance due to the presence of the AvtoVAZ car factories. 
AvtoVAZ has suffered severe economic problems over the last years, partly because of 
mismanagement and corruption. However, since the car manufacturer is the main employer for 
most of the population, the Russian government had tried to keep the car industry alive by 
means of subsidies to prevent social upheaval.20 In recent years, though, economic troubles 
                                                 
18 E. Belokurova and D. Vorobëv. "Obščestvennoe Učastie Na Lokal'nom Urovne V Sovremennoj Rossii." 
Neprikosnovennyj zapas 13, no. 2 (2010). 
19 T. Lankina and A. Voznaya, "New Data on Protest Trends in Russia's Regions," Europe-Asia Studies 67, 
no. 2 (2015): 334. 
20 C. Clover, "Russian one-company towns face decline," Financial Times 2009. 
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have led to tensions and demonstrations. This makes Tolyatti a good subject for a case study 
on the structure of civil society and its interaction with the government in the ‘second Russia’. 
This thesis will use the city of Tolyatti as a case study for assessing the interactions between 
civil society organizations and movements and the local government. What are the most 
important properties of civil society in Tolyatti? How does civil society in Tolyatti react on 
political, economic and social issues,21  and in which ways does it interact with the local 
authorities? The first chapter contains a theoretical exploration of the concept of civil society. 
The second chapter gives an overview of existing research regarding the functioning of civil 
society in current-day Russia. The third chapter will describe the political and social situation 
in the city of Tolyatti and its region, and the different institutions that exist for interaction 
between the government and society. The fourth and fifth chapters will give an account of two 
important topics in which civil society has been playing an important role: the problems at 
AvtoVAZ, more specifically at one of its suppliers, and the protection of forest areas in and 
around the city. These accounts will bring to the fore important structural properties of civil 
society in the town. These will be discussed in the conclusion of this work.  
This thesis will give a clearer picture of the state and development of civil society and its 
organizations, and the challenges they encounter in a town that is very different from Moscow 
and St. Petersburg. This will give a better insight in the civil society situation in the ‘second 
Russia’, where a significant part of the Russian population lives. 
  
                                                 
21 Categorization based on T. Lankina and A. Voznaya,  332. 
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CHAPTER I: EXPLORING THE CONCEPTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Although ‘civil society’ has become a widely used concept in political science, it is also an ill-
defined one. Usually, different studies use very different definitions of civil society, sometimes 
choosing one that best fits the case studied (as was done by Chebankova), but also quite often 
narrowing the focus to non-governmental organizations – the most ‘visible’ part of civil 
society. Although this has led to valuable insights, it has also made the study of this 
phenomenon somewhat incoherent. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the concept of civil 
society in its different meanings, especially when it comes to interaction with the state. In this 
chapter, three concepts of state-civil society interaction will be explored: civil society as the 
state of civility, civil society as a public sphere, and civil society as a mechanism in modern 
states. 
One needs to keep in mind that civil society is both a normative and descriptive concept – 
that is, it is a concept in political philosophy to define how societies are shaped by the existence 
of a state, as well as a concept in political science to study societal activity that happens outside 
the formal state apparatus. 22 This chapter will explore both normative and descriptive concepts 
of civil society. This will help in creating a framework for the case study that is to follow, as 
well as interpreting the existing vast literature on civil society in contemporary Russia. 
Civil society as the state of civility 
In early modern Europe, as states started to exert more and more centralized power over 
their territories, philosophers started searching for a justification for the existence of states. 
One of the most important authors in this field is Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes, the 
natural condition of humankind is a state of perpetual ‘war of all against all’, in which every 
person is strongly guided by their own interest. Since there is no security, people can only rely 
on their own strength.23 The solution to this, according to Hobbes, is the creation of a dominant 
authority, which Hobbes calls Leviathan. Here, every person of the community agrees to give 
sovereign power to one entity (preferably one man) that will arbitrate between members of the 
community and treat them equally. In exchange for a state of peace, the members of the 
community should obey the sovereign.24  This view was nuanced by John Locke and the 
                                                 
22 O. Hoppe-Kondrikova, Struggling for Civility. The Idea and the Reality of Civil Society. An Interdisciplinary 
Study with a Focus on Russia (Nijmegen 2012), conclusion. 
23 J. Gray, Post-Liberalism. Studies in Political Thought (New York 1993), 6-7. 
24 S.M. DeLue and T.M. Dale, Political Thinking, Political Theory, and Civil Society (New York 2016), 132-
33. 
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philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, who stated that individuals are guided in their 
actions by universal morale and reason.25 The state, according to Locke, is necessary to guard 
‘civil interests’, but it does not dictate religious views, and people are free to form associations, 
and to rebel if the state fails at its task. Peace is maintained by mutual respect and toleration.26 
What becomes clear in the views of Hobbes and Locke, is the fact that state power is a 
prerequisite for the existence of civility: without state authority guaranteeing civil interests and 
peace, civil society is impossible. This contrasts with the view that has been dominant in 
Eastern European studies, in which civil society is an opponent of the authoritarian state,27 as 
was witnessed in the revolutions of 1989 in central and eastern Europe. However, it is a very 
useful insight for the case of Russia, which experienced a collapse of state power in the 1990s, 
and with it, failed to build an effective civil society. 
Civil society as a separate sphere 
The idea of civil society being a separate entity from the state starts with Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel. As the idea of universal reason accounting for human action was challenged 
by David Hume, Hegel sought to find other mechanisms that create unity in civil society.28 The 
basis for Hegel’s civil society is founded in Immanuel Kant’s foundation of morale in Reason. 
Whereas Kant reserved morale for the private sphere (distinguishing between private morality 
and public legality), Hegel considers this morale the ethical framework of civil society.29 Civil 
society is thus a sphere that is separate from the state, and divided into realms: corporations, 
estates and social classes are places where moral socialization takes place. Civil society also 
mediates between the state and the private sphere.30 
Hegel’s view of civil society as a separate sphere of different realms, in which socialization 
and mediation take place, influenced the concept of civil society that political scientists started 
to use, as in the 1970s and ‘80s, the world witnessed struggles between authoritarian regimes 
and society organizations. The concept of civil society, a concept that was largely neglected by 
political scientists in the decades before, was rediscovered.31 The transformations of 1989-91 
further increased the popularity of the concept, and civil society not only became a dominant 
theme in the discourse of political science, but civil society promotion also became a main 
                                                 
25  A.B. Seligman, "Civil Society as Idea and Ideal," in Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, ed. S. 
Chambers and W. Kymlicka (Oxford: 2002), 14-20. 
26 S.M. DeLue and T.M. Dale, 154-58. 
27 E. Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin's Russia, 99. 
28 A.B. Seligman, 20-21. 
29 Ibid., 24-27. 
30 N. Chandeke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (New Delhi 1995), 126-28. 
31 Ibid., 13. 
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policy direction for many actors, for example the European Union in regard to its eastern 
neighbors.32 
This is where a view of civil society against the state became dominant: civility was seen 
as a phenomenon separate from state power that could be a positive force in the process of 
democratization.33 A central aspect here is the idea of modernization, as described by Max 
Weber: with technological progress and increased mobility, societies become less defined by 
tradition and more by rationality.34  Jürgen Habermas, building on Weber’s theory, stressed the 
importance of language in the rationalization of, what he called, the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). 
This lifeworld is the ‘background environment’ of values and interpretations that a person 
regards as ‘self-evident’. Elements of this lifeworld are individual, but an important feature of 
a society is that members experience a shared lifeworld which connects them. According to 
Habermas, the process of rationalization that Weber described should be understood as “a shift 
from normatively ascribed agreement to communicatively achieved understanding”.35 What 
this means is that, rather than adherence to fixed ascribed norms, the modern lifeworld is 
defined by communication and discussion, in which agreement is reached based on rational 
argumentation. This gives the possibility of constant reflection and renewal of existing 
traditions and values.36 
Habermas provided his theory with a historic basis by describing the rise of coffee houses, 
salons and table societies in the 17th and 18th century, where the developing bourgeois class 
met to discuss political issues. He pointed at the creation of journals of opinion and the 
establishment of social networks that gave rise to a separate sphere of communication and 
opinion-making. Habermas described developments in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, and stressed the importance of civil law that guaranteed individual freedoms. What 
unites this public sphere is the power of reason: consensus is formed around the most 
convincing argument.37 Although Habermas admitted that this description of a common sphere 
of communication is, in fact, an ideal-type, he emphasized the empirical base on which his 
theory is founded.38 
                                                 
32 N. Shapovalova and R. Youngs, "The Changing Nature of EU Support to Civil Society," in Civil Society 
and Democracy Promotion, ed. Timm Beichelt, et al. (Zurich: 2014), 86-87. 
33 E. Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin's Russia, 101. 
34 O. Hoppe-Kondrikova, 80-83. 
35 W. Outhwaite, Habermas. A Critical Introduction (Oxford 1994), 74-76. 
36 Ibid., 87. 
37 C. Calhoun, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig 
Calhoun (London: 1992), 10-15. 
38 J.L. Cohen and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (London1992), 214. 
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The conceptualizations by Hegel and Habermas, to a large extent, explain the function of 
civil society in open democracies in Western Europe and North America. Media and organized 
groups (such as NGOs, but also political parties) are actors in the common sphere of 
communication, in which consensus is formed. These organizations also form the places where 
socialization of the population takes place, where public issues are discussed and debated. In 
Russia, the sphere of media and organized groups is heavily influenced by the state. Media 
freedom is heavily restricted, but there is some variation in repression, with the biggest media 
being state-controlled, but smaller outlets usually remaining autonomous (though they are often 
under duress). Weblogs and social media groups on the Internet, which can be considered an 
extension of the Habermasian public sphere,39 are more autonomous, but also here, pressure of 
the state is increasing.40 
Although Habermas’ focus on communicational consensus formation, in which discussions 
and media play a big role, goes a long way in explaining how civil society can spread ideas and 
advance consensus, the interaction between state and civil society remains unclear. Habermas 
considered state and civil society separate spheres, which means, as Cohen and Arato pointed 
out, that the sphere of civil society and its members “have a polemical, critical, argumentative 
relation to the state rather than a participatory one. They can supervise, influence, and perhaps 
somehow ‘control’ power, but they cannot themselves possess a part of state power.”41 Here, 
there is friction with Habermas’ historicist argument that “public opinion came to regard itself 
as the only legitimate source of law”.42 Habermas pays little attention to social movements and 
organizations. When he takes them into account, he views them as ‘communicative action 
movements’ that challenge and might change the existing communicational consensus, but do 
not directly influence the political process.43 
Civil society as social action and a mechanism of the state 
The question of how modern civil society influences social action and the state, leads us to the 
third concept of civil society: that of a mechanism of social action and the state. The way in 
which the process of modernization influenced social action was described by Charles Tilly. 
According to Tilly, until the mid-nineteenth century, most collective action was motivated by 
                                                 
39  J. Bohman, "Expanding dialogue: The Internet, the public sphere and prospects for transnational 
democracy," in After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere, ed. Nick Crossley and John Michael 
Roberts (Oxford: 2004), 133. 
40Freedom House, "Freedom on the Net 2016: Country Profile Russia," 
41 J.L. Cohen and A. Arato, 222. 
42 Ibid. 
43 W. Outhwaite, 106-07. 
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‘reactive’ and ‘competitive’ claims, exercised by community groups. Competitive claims are 
caused by rivalries between different local communities, usually about resources. Reactive 
claims are motivated by changes outside the community, such as tax increases by the state, or 
changes in market conditions. When local communities were replaced by the larger structures 
of society, collective action became motivated by ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ claims. In a 
modern society, groups of interest are formed and mobilized to achieve a common goal. These 
groups can form independently from the state, on a voluntary basis.44 Modern communication 
and media attention play a big role. These groups operate in a rational way, using social and 
financial capital to attain their goals. Struggle within civil society, here, is not a problem but a 
feature: groups may grow and decline, mobilization may gain traction, be successful, or fail, 
after which new groups are formed. 
A civil society not based on competitive claims and tug of war between local communities 
and the state, but on mobilization to achieve a common goal though rational methods is 
extremely useful for both society and the state. In a modern, bureaucratic state, it is difficult 
for the state to check the behavior of bureaucrats and other actors. Especially corruption 
negatively influences the quality of state services – even more, if state officials on high 
positions (such as in parliament) are corrupted, this severely influences the rational, 
“Weberian” quality of bureaucracy, which leads to reduced state capacity. Civil society and 
collective action serve, as McCubbins and Schwartz named it, as ‘fire alarms’: an external type 
of monitoring and coercion, stimulating state organizations and officials to act according to 
norms. States that lack an effective civil society are often forced to rely much more on policing 
(‘internal coercion’), which is a less effective oversight mechanism.45 Mechanisms in states 
with weaker civil societies will often be more defined by patrimonial relations and less by 
rational-legal methods than states with more active civil societies.46 
In Russia, state capacity has increased significantly in the first decade of the 21st century, as 
the Kremlin reasserted control over state agencies. The government became more successful 
in fighting terrorism and crime. However, Russian state capacity and quality remains 
significantly lower than in other states, since informal and patrimonial practices continue to be 
dominant in the country’s bureaucracy, as coercive mechanisms, especially external coercion, 
failed to improve. This is not surprising, since the existence of a patrimonial system is highly 
                                                 
44 J.L. Cohen and A. Arato, 500-03. 
45 Taylor B.D. Taylor, State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (2011), 29-
30. 
46 Ibid., 28. 
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advantageous to the political powerholders themselves – they use their position to extract rents 
from the state.47 This, however, forms a paradox: on the one hand, the Kremlin aims to increase 
state capacity and quality, but on the other hand, it fails to develop (and even suppresses) those 
mechanisms that could lead to increased state capacity. This paradox could explain the often-
contradictory policies of, on the one hand, applauding some civil initiatives, but on the other 
hand, suppressing civil organizations that are critical of political power. 48 
The study of civil society in Russia 
The three concepts that were described in this chapter are important in the study of civil society 
in Russia. The first concept emphasized the often-overlooked notion that without the state 
guaranteeing peace and stability, civil society cannot exist. It is useful to assess to what extent 
the state, in maintaining civility in society and serving the interests of the governing elite, relies 
on outright repression in the absence of a strong enough consensus in society, and to what 
extent it can rely on societal consensus (either pre-existing or constructed).   
The second concept, which conceptualizes civil society as a sphere, emphasizes the 
importance of communication and socialization in the public domain, which defines public 
consensus. In Russia, the public sphere is heavily influenced by the state, which controls most 
media outlets – in this way, consensus in society can be expected to be heavily state-influenced 
as well. 
The third concept, in which civil society in its modern form increases state capacity and 
quality, is a double-edged sword for the authorities. On the one hand, the Kremlin would like 
to harness its power to increase state capacity, but on the other hand, it forms a danger to the 
regime itself, which benefits from the continuation of paternalistic mechanisms on the highest 
political level. How such mechanisms work on a lower level is one of the research topics of 
this thesis. It is also of interest to which extent civil society groups act as ‘modern’, acting in a 
rational way to achieve common goals. 
The following chapter will describe and assess several studies that have been conducted on 
post-Soviet Russia, and how the different concepts of civil society have been applied in a 
Russian context. 
 
 
  
                                                 
47 Ibid., 26-27. 
48K. Latuxina, "Prezident prizval NKO rešatʹ obščenacionalʹnye zadači," Rossijskaja gazeta 2015. 
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CHAPTER II: CIVIL SOCIETY, POST-COMMUNISM AND THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
 
In the years after the end of the Cold War and the establishment of democracy in many 
countries in central Europe, hopes about the future of democracy and civil society in post-
Soviet states were high. However, although many post-communist countries have developed 
real democracies and active civil societies, other states have turned towards authoritarian rule. 
In the 1990s, it was unclear in which direction Russia was heading, and until 2004, the country 
was still labelled ‘partly free’ by the Freedom House49 (whereas e.g. Belarus was already 
considered ‘non-free’ in the 1990s).50 However, since the 2000s, the political and associational 
freedom has been steadily declining. 
This chapter will use publications from the past decades to assess the state of civil society 
in Russia, and define them with the help of the insights that were obtained in the previous 
chapter. In this way, this chapter will serve to give a background to the case study that is to 
follow. 
Civil society and the public sphere in the 1990s 
The communist experience severely impacted civil activity in central and eastern Europe. In 
1995-97, surveys showed that the average number of organizational memberships per person 
in post-communist countries remained less than one (0.91) - almost twice as low as the number 
for post-authoritarian countries, such as Chile and Argentina (1.82).51 The effect of a past 
communist regime is even stronger than the effect of economic and institutional development, 
or the number of years a country has had democratic institutions.52 Post-communist citizens 
are usually twice and sometimes thrice less likely to be a member of any type of organization, 
with the notable exception of trade unions: for this type of organization, citizens of post-
communist countries are more likely to be members than citizens of post-authoritarian states 
(though not as likely as in older democracies), which can probably be explained by the fact that 
in post-communist countries, trade unions are often former state organizations of which 
workers automatically become members.53  
Professor Morjé Howard used an interpretive approach to explain the roots of non-
participation, by conducting interviews in the former GDR and Russia. In this way, he 
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discerned different factors. Firstly, because membership of organizations was obligatory under 
communist rule, citizens often distrust public organization. This does not mean that citizens 
are disinterested: interviewees expressed willingness to take part in demonstrations and strikes, 
but apprehension to commit to organizations on a more permanent basis. The relative strength 
of family and friendship networks in post-communist countries is another reason that citizens 
do not feel the need to participate in public organizations: they feel content with the personal 
contacts they have. The last factor that Morjé Howard discerns, is a general feeling of 
disappointment in post-communist developments: people seemed to have held beliefs in 
sudden, ‘spontaneous’ improvements in their economic position and personal happiness. 
However, the process turned out to be much slower and more difficult, which made people 
retreat in their personal spheres, rather than put energy in seemingly unattainable, abstract 
ideals.54 These three aspects distinguish the post-communist world from older democracies and 
post-authoritarian countries. 
The media in Russia in the first decade after the end of the Soviet Union were largely free 
from government control. However, news coverage was far from fair, and regulations regarding 
funding by interest groups were ignored. In this way, political parties and candidates could buy 
huge amounts of media coverage, despite their low support among voters. Rather than 
investigative journalism, many journalists practiced tactics of kompromat, in which candidates 
were smeared with scandal stories that had little basis in facts. In this way, rather than 
facilitating the birth of a ‘public sphere’ in the Habermasian sense, the media contributed to 
the disengagement of citizens from public affairs.55 
The weakness of civil society in the 1990s can be linked to the weakness of the Russian 
state at that time. This decade was characterized by the loss of state capacity and 
decentralization, which made state organs subordinate to interest (sometimes criminal) 
groups.56 Here, we can speak about a loss of civility in the Lockean sense of the word, where 
the absence of authority leads to a struggle between individuals and interest groups. This 
benefited those who had financial resources, but not the population at large. 
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Civil society under Putin and Medvedev 
The period under the presidency of Putin and Medvedev is usually characterized as an era of 
administrative and industrial recentralization, in which the role of both independent business 
and regional elites sharply declined. This recentralization was initiated by the Kremlin and 
stimulated by economic growth that was based on raw materials. 57  Despite the economic 
growth, civil society continued to be regarded as weak, in the organizational sense as well as 
in the ‘Habermasian’ sense. NGOs, already suffering from a lack of enthusiasm from Russian 
people, were accused of serving dubious, commercial and foreign interests by the Kremlin, and 
Russian media, already lacking a critical journalistic tradition, came under pressure of a more 
and more authoritarian state.58 
Up to 2011, most of the literature on Russian civil society has followed the line of Morjé 
Howard: Russian civil society is weak, because of a lack of trust in public organizations and 
disappointment in the post-communist changes.59 This weakness served both as an explanation 
for the existing situation and a cause for the constriction of pluralism by the Kremlin. Putin’s 
initiative to announce a Civic Forum in 2001 and his endorsement of the idea of civil society 
were regarded either lip service, or parts of a bigger design to restrict pluralism and increase 
state power.60 
The situation changed in December 2011, when Moscow experienced the largest street 
protests since the end of the Soviet Union, after the fraudulent Duma elections of that year and 
Putin’s announcement that he would run for president again.61 It became clear that Russians 
are well-aware of the political situation, willing to press their demands and capable of 
mobilization.62 Although the protests did not bring about any change in the political situation 
in Russia, it did lead to a reassessment of civil society by political scientists: instead of simply 
classifying civil society in Russia as weak, scholars started paying more attention to its nature 
and development. 
In ‘Civil Society in Putin’s Russia’, Elena Chebankova characterized two ‘phases’ of civil 
society: a private phase, which is characterized by withdrawal into the private sphere, and a 
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public phase, which is characterized by active engagement.63 She sees a transition from the 
private to the public phase in the years 2006-9, as a result of economic prosperity and 
disappointment with the level of civil rights. 64  She sees a positive re-evaluation of the 
immediate post-Soviet period, with the dislike of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin 
decreasing, and increased public activity, for example in the form of independent trade 
unions.65  
Chebankova remains pessimistic about the state of the Russian public sphere: TV and press 
are dominated by trivia, sensationalism and entertainment – public affairs are marginalized. A 
large part of the Russian population does not read books or newspapers at all.66 Rather than a 
Habermasian sphere of ‘normative understanding’, she views the public sphere in Russia as 
dominated by radical and extremist movements67 (Chebankova also considers liberals who 
consider the current regime as illegitimate, such as Garry Kasparov and his United Civic Front, 
radicals68). 
She discerns the positive effects of the new ‘public phase’ in the emergence of grassroots 
movements. She sees a trend in which civic movements start around local issues, but then 
become politicized and start focusing on broader, more structural problems.69 An excellent 
example is the Svoboda Vybora movement, which started as a reaction on the proposed ban on 
right-hand-drive cars in Russia in 2005, which it successfully contested. After that, activists set 
up a campaign against the use of vehicle emergency lights (migalki) by officials, and later even 
participated in the opposition movement ‘The Other Russia’. 70  Several grassroots labor 
organizations and ecological movements followed the same trend.71 Chebankova, however, 
warns against excessive optimism, as the social base of such movements is confined to the 
proto-middle class. According to her, “the majority of Russians are keen on change 
theoretically, [but] they are not prepared to sacrifice their time, energy and in particular comfort 
for the achievement of these goals.”72 
Samuel Greene’s “Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia” takes a 
different approach by focusing on the relationship between the Russian state and Russian 
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society. In this, he harks back to Locke’s definition of civil society, in which civility is the 
result of state regulation of civil interests. According to Greene, Russia is characterized by a 
strong regime that, paradoxically, finds its power in the weak institutionalization of the Russian 
state: the Russian elite has the power to determine the rules of the political game.73 Although 
institutions similar to democratic states do exist, the Russian elite regards them as their private 
property, which can be used for personal benefit and should be shielded from outsiders.74 
Greene introduces the concept of ‘club goods’: a category between ‘private goods’ and ‘public 
goods’, that can be accessed only by members of an exclusive group. In Russia, officials do 
not hold their position for the job itself, but as a way to become a member of the ‘club’ and 
gain access to ‘club goods’. Becoming a member of this ‘club’ means giving up economic and 
political freedom, in exchange for state money and large-scale consumption. ‘Club rule’ is 
nothing new for Russia. The Soviet nomenklatura is the classical example of a club, in which 
scarce goods (e.g. dachas) were distributed. As the Soviet Union fell apart, so did the club of 
nomenklatura. However, the economic growth of the 2000s has led to the establishment of a 
new ‘club’ – one could say, a new nomenklatura.75 
The way the state is run has a profound impact on civil society in Russia. The Russian elite 
does not really need Russian society for its own well-being, since its wealth depends on the 
export of oil and gas. As a result, the Russian state is disengaged from its citizens and tries to 
minimize interaction. Therefore, it makes little sense for Russian citizens to engage in 
collective action, since the ruling nomenklatura has the power to block such initiatives – after 
all, none of the state institutions – be it judiciary, executive or legislative – are real, independent 
organs. However, Russia’s elite needs society for its ‘legitimization rituals’: the acts that are 
characteristic of democratic states, elections being the most visible of them. Here, then, civil 
society has a chance for collective action, by refusing to passively play its designated part in 
the ritual. This is exactly what happened in the 2011 protests.76 
Greene, therefore, argues that Russian civil society is not ‘weak’ because of a lack of 
awareness of democratic principles, but because Russian citizens are very much aware of their 
limitations and opportunities in the current political environment. The nature of civil society, 
therefore, reflects the nature of the state: when the state acts in a deinstitutionalized way, 
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Russians react as individuals; when the state acts in a more institutionalized way, Russians 
react as citizens.77 
The Russian state and civil society after 2011 
After the 2011 protests, one of the questions that researchers asked is whether the protests 
were a sign of a new era in Russian civil activity. In a 2013 paper titled ‘Beyond Bolotnaia’, 
Samuel Greene distinguished between ‘legacy’ networks, which existed before the mass 
protests, and ‘greenfield’ networks, which were formed during the demonstrations. By 
analyzing Facebook data, he concluded that members of greenfield networks were more likely 
to have an affinity for online liberal media outlets than members of legacy networks. Members 
of legacy networks, however, played a more prominent role in the protests (e.g. as speakers at 
rallies). What he concludes from this, is that the ‘greenfield’ participants were, most likely, 
already politically engaged before the start of the demonstrations, albeit passively. What 
activated them was the confluence of ‘legacy’ civic activity and the bigger story of the injustice 
of the elections. In other words, neither ‘legacy’ activity nor ‘greenfield’ political engagement 
were new – what was new, was the interplay between both domains.78 
In the face of mass protests, the Kremlin also changed its policy towards civil action and 
protests. Whereas initially, the protests were tolerated by the authorities, the tone changed in 
February 2012, as Putin declared that the protests were instigated by the West, branding the 
protesters as traitors. The narrative of protesters as a ‘fifth column’ of enemy forces allowed 
the regime to further restrict civil society organizations, and gained traction after the 2014 
Maidan revolution in Ukraine: the new Ukrainian government was branded a ‘fascist junta’ 
and became the face of the anti-Russian threat in Kremlin propaganda.79 The annexation of 
Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine were used to influence public opinion, and also 
stimulated civic action in support of the regime, such as large rallies in support of Crimea, and 
also activities to revive the memory of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, both anti-
regime protests and grassroots movements continued to be active.80 
Increased pressure from civil society and an increasingly felt need to ‘manage’ society, 
rather than ignore it, however, is not the only problem the Russian regime is facing. After 2012, 
the Russian economy has come increasingly under pressure from low oil prices, foreign 
sanctions and countersanctions. For the Russian population, this often led to lower salaries (or 
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no salaries at all) and thus lower welfare. For the Russian elite, the economic hardship led to 
lower rents, and the foreign sanctions meant less opportunities to enjoy their wealth abroad.81 
Some members of the elite, such as German Gref (the CEO of the state-owned Sberbank), 
started advocating structural reforms of the economy to maintain economic growth in the face 
of low oil prices.82 This would mean a course towards a more ‘rationalized’ government 
structure, away from the corruption that cripples state capacity. However, this would endanger 
the very basis of the current regime, and would give civil society actors more possibilities to 
interact with the government. 
The places where the tension between elite corruption, the economic downturn, and ordinary 
citizens has become most visible, are the towns in Russia in which a large part of the population 
is dependent on a few big companies for its employment. Economic troubles in these 
companies – often highly outdated and inefficient plants – have a negative impact on the entire 
town. Tolyatti is such a town: a large part of the population is dependent on the automotive 
industry, which has been struggling at least since the 2008 financial crisis. 83  In 2015, 
AvtoVAZagregat, one of the largest suppliers of AvtoVAZ (the manufacturer of Lada cars) 
stopped its production as a result financial problems, and the procedure to declare the company 
bankrupt was started.84 On August 30, 2016, the company was officially declared bankrupt.85 
The situation has led to demonstrations of workers, whose salaries were no longer paid, and 
tensions with the local authorities, including the governor of the region.86 The unfolding of the 
events and the interaction between society and the local state will be the topic of the fourth 
chapter of this thesis. However, first, it is necessary to give an overview of the political and 
social situation in Tolyatti and the Samara region, and the structure of social partnership in 
Russia. This will be the topic of chapter three. 
 
  
                                                 
81 S. Greene, "The End of Ambiguity in Russia," 258. 
82 Ibid., 257. 
83 T. Lasseter, "Facing massive layoffs, Russia's 'Detroit' feels the chill," McClatchy Newspapers 2009. 
84 E. Vʹjuškova, "«AvtoVAZagregat» podvezli do bankrotstva," Kommersant 2015. 
85 "«AvtoVAZagregat» priznali bankrotom iz-za dolgov," Republic.ru 2016. 
86 "Gubernator Samarskoj oblasti prigrozil «nikogda» ne pogasitʹ dolgi postavščika AvtoVAZa," Republic.ru 
2016. 
  
22 
 
CHAPTER III: TOLYATTI AS A RUSSIAN MONOTOWN 
The city of Tolyatti (population in January 2016: 712.619 people) used to be the ‘automotive 
capital’ of the Soviet Union: it is home to the AvtoVAZ plant, which produced cars with the 
brand name ‘Lada’. However, in the years after the demise of the Soviet Union, it has more 
and more become the symbol of a widespread phenomenon in the Russian Federation: the 
monofunctional town, or monotown.87 These kinds of towns are mostly dependent on only one 
industry. Approximately 13.5 million Russians live in these towns with populations roughly 
between 5000 and 700.000 inhabitants. The social and economic problems in these towns are 
characteristic of the Putin era: the move towards authoritarianism and centralization have 
reduced state capacity in these regions, and the absence of mechanisms of checks and balances 
(such as fair elections and uncensored press) gives little perspective for improvement. In this 
chapter, I will first give an overview of the symptoms and causes of the problems in Russian 
monotowns, using the existing literature. After that, I will give an overview of the social, 
economic, and political situation in Tolyatti. 
Russian monotowns, government legitimacy and labor protests 
The urban geography of dispersed monotowns is unique to Russia and a result of the state-
enforced industrialization of the Soviet era, in which proximity to basic materials and national 
security trumped market logic. 88  This makes Russian industry in its current form very 
uncompetitive in the global economy. On the other hand, modernization would require massive 
layoffs and relocation of capital and workforce, which could lead to major social unrest.89 The 
disengagement of the Russian state from society, as described in the previous chapter, makes 
the state incapable of performing such a transformation. Increasing interaction with society by 
installing and enforcing formal procedures is against the interests of the nomenklatura, and is 
therefore unlikely to happen. However, enforcing a modernization in more informal ways could 
trigger a legitimacy crisis: the current Russian government maintains its legitimacy by 
maintaining order and stability, and enforcing an initially disruptive transformation would 
undermine this. Therefore, the government has no choice but to subsidize the outdated 
industries and, as Gaddy and Ickes wrote, “keep the lights on”.90 
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The government has been able to perform this task more or less successfully over the last 
decade, thanks to the raw materials boom of the first decade of the 21st century. However, as 
the global economic crisis of the late 2000s affected Russia, Vladimir Putin intervened 
personally several times to prevent a local crisis from escalating. These interventions were 
personal action of Putin himself, and ‘bypassed’ the Russian state. For example, in 2009, 
workers in Pikalovo, one of the monotowns, blocked a major road out of anger over unpaid 
wages. Putin, who was not president, but prime minister at that time, gathered the owners and 
management of the plant and publicly shamed them for their ‘greediness’. He personally 
ordered them to pay the wages by the end of the day.91 Observers likened the events to those 
in pre-revolutionary Russia, where the ‘good’ czar punished ‘bad’ boyars to placate the angry 
mobs of common people.92 The events made clear that the Russian state is still a very weak 
state (as in the 1990s), even though the regime tightened its grip on the country. This situation 
benefits the regime: a weak state leads to a weak civil society, as interaction between society 
and state is minimized. Where the failure of state mechanisms leads to crises (as in Pikalovo), 
personal, non-state intervention is preferred over state intervention. The latter would be the 
implementation and enforcement of policy to prevent and resolve these crises.  
The increasing number of labor-related protests in the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century led some observers to predict Putin’s popularity rating to decrease sharply. Although, 
according to the Levada center, his approval rating indeed declined (from 88% in September 
2008 to 61% in November 2013), the rating did not fall lower than 61% - which is still a rating 
leaders in the West would be more than happy with. This shows that, in general, the Russian 
population keep seeing Putin as separate from the government and its officials; as Lev Gudkov 
of the Levada Center said: “He plays a symbolic role, not a practical one.”.93 The fact that 
Putin’s approval ratings soared as the Ukraine crisis of 2014 set in confirms this view: even 
though economic hardship has worsened in the country, the annexation of Crimea and Russian 
involvement in the Syrian civil war made Putin look like a strong leader to most Russians.94 
Some Russia observers (such as RFE/RL’s Brian Whitmore) observed that Putin had 
reinvented himself, putting in place a ‘new social contract’, replacing stability and relative 
welfare for the idea of Russia as a great power, as a means of legitimizing his rule.95 
                                                 
91 J. Kusluch, "Russian Monotowns: Tinderboxes For Unrest – Analysis," Eurasia Review 2016. 
92 L. Aron, "Darkness on the Edge of Monotown," The New York Times 2009. 
93 E. Teague, "How Did the Russian Population Respond to the Global Financial Crisis?," Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27, no. 3-4 (2011). 
94 Levada Center, "Putin's Approval Rating". 
95 B. Whitmore, "Russia's Patriotic Fix," RFE/RL 2014. 
  
24 
 
However, even if we can speak about a ‘new social contract’, this seems to be very much 
limited to Putin as a person. According to the Levada Center, the approval ratings of prime 
minister Dmitri Medvedev have declined from 68% in October 2014, to 48% two years later. 
The approval rating of the Russian government was relatively low in October 2013 (before the 
Ukraine crisis), namely 44%. A year later, the rating spiked to 64%, after the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine. But by October 2016, the rating had declined sharply again, to 47%.96 
Whereas, for the President, the change in the means of legitimization seems to be sustainable, 
for the Russian state, it seems to have led to only a temporary boost in approval ratings. 
The declining faith in the government in the years after the intervention in Ukraine coincides 
with an increasing number of labor protests across the country: whereas between 2008 and 
2014, the average number of labor protest was 241 per year, the number grew to 409 in 2015, 
according to the Center for Social and Labor rights. Some of the protests gained nationwide 
attention, such as the protest of truck drivers over the so-called Platon, a road use fee for trucks. 
Most of the labor actions are organized by independent trade unions or are wildcat actions, and 
only a few actions were interregional.97 Protests erupt for a variety of reasons, but the most 
common reason for workers to protest is the non-payment of wages: in the first eight months 
of 2016, little more than half (53%) of all protests was ignited by wage arrears. Dismay over 
decisions by management and owners are the second most common cause for protests (34%). 
In such situations, management decisions are often taken without consent from the workers, 
and presented as accomplished facts.98 
Protests usually erupt as a reaction to an immediate, local cause, and do not get a more 
institutionalized character – a notion that is underlined by the fact that since 2010, just nine 
percent of labor protests were carried out according to the Labor Code, making them 
technically illegal.99 Protests usually remain intra-regional; only in a few exceptional cases, the 
protests grows to nationwide proportions (the platon protests were such an exception; and even 
then, the protest movement did not crystallize into an institutional form). This makes labor 
protests in Russia different from those in most Western countries – in Tilly’s characterization, 
much more pre-modern rather than modern. This is surprising, given that Russia is an 
industrialized country with a large working class, in which (as we have seen earlier) a large 
part remains a member of a trade union. 
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Labor representation and social partnership 
The high degree of trade union membership in Russia is one of the legacies of the Soviet 
past. Soviet era labor unions were state organizations, that functioned as ‘transmission belts’ 
of the Communist party, by overseeing the implementation of party policy in enterprises. 
Almost all workers were members of trade unions, which were organized in a single hierarchy 
that was headed by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS). The workers 
mostly perceived union membership as a means of gaining access to healthcare facilities and 
vacation resorts, not as a way to defend their rights as workers.100 
  In 1990, the VTsSPS was replaced by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of 
Russia (FNPR). The organization inherited the resources of its predecessor and saw for itself a 
role as protector of both productivity and workers’ living standards. Because of this double 
role, it was unwilling to engage in labor protests, even though such protests surged because of 
the economic reforms. As a result, alternative labor unions emerged, which started leading and 
organizing protests. The biggest associations of independent trade unions are the All-Russian 
Confederation of Labor (VKT), the Russian Confederation of Labor (KTR) and the Trade 
Union Association of Russia (SOTSPROF). The official trade unions usually emphasize the 
common interests of employers and workers in ‘keeping the lights on’. The free trade unions 
focus more on mobilizing workers to put pressure on the employers. The relationship between 
the alternative and official unions is usually tense, which led to a ‘divided labor movement’ 
which is characteristic not only for Russia, but also for other post-Soviet countries, such as 
Belarus and Ukraine.101 
In 2001, Russia adopted the new Labor Code. This code was based on the idea of ‘social 
partnership’, and was designed after the model as it exists in Europe, in which employers, 
employees and the government engage and bargain as partners. However, since Russia lacked 
strong government institutions, a stable economy and a strong welfare state, the effects of the 
Labor Code were very different from what one would expect in European countries. Instead of 
creating equal partners, the Labor Code gave the leading role in collective bargaining in the 
first place to the state, and in the second place to the employers; the labor unions are by far the 
weakest partner. In the Labor Code, the unions lost their right to announce a strike 
independently. If a strike is announced and approved, the trade unions must announce the date 
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when the strike ends.102 This put the free unions at a huge disadvantage vis-à-vis the official 
unions, as their main source of power consisted of workers’ mobilization. Furthermore, free 
unions were almost excluded from commissions that engaged in collective bargaining, as they 
have much fewer members than the official ones.103 
As a result of the less militant attitude of the official unions and their position as least 
powerful of the three partners, employers treat them, as Olimpieva phrased it, “as a subdivision 
of the human resources department whose job is to motivate and support worker morale, or to 
help in distributing social benefits and conducting social policy at the enterprise.”104 ‘Social 
partnership’, in this way, has become a mechanism in the goal of ‘keeping the lights on’, in 
which the labor unions play the role as ‘lubricant’ to keep the factory working, by functioning 
as an intermediary lobby for the workers, and providing help to the members, in material for 
(e.g. interest-free loans and health insurance) as well as in non-material form (e.g. help with 
the preparation of official documents). 105  
In non-crisis times, the existing structure performs fairly well in keeping factories working. 
However, when a crisis develops and becomes acute, the model offers no real institutional 
levers to resolve the problems between the workers and the employers. Strikes are not 
considered a constructive way to resolve a conflict, and employers often simply refuse to 
negotiate with labor leaders they consider too militant. If the threat of a strike erupts, usually 
the free unions take the lead, and the official unions function as a ‘buffer’ between workers and 
the management, trying to prevent open conflict. The official unions then try to resolve the 
problem via a ‘hierarchical dialog’, usually in a non-institutionalized way. Sometimes, this 
mechanism does not work: in Pikalovo, the local official union took the lead in spontaneous 
protest actions, which caused a negative reaction from the FNPR before the problem was 
resolved by personal interference by Putin. 106 
The structures of social partnership in Tolyatti 
In the city of Tolyatti, the implementation of the idea of ‘social partnership’ predates the new 
Labor Code: a tripartite committee on the regulation of social and labor relations has been 
active since September 1997. This committee regularly signs agreements on the regulation of 
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social and labor relations, usually valid for three years. 107 The government is represented by 
the heads of several municipality departments, such as economic development and labor 
protection. The employers are represented by managers of several larger companies of Tolyatti, 
and by a local representative of the Samara regional branch of Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). Smaller companies are represented by the Tolyatti Chamber of 
Commerce. Labor is represented by the official unions of several companies, including 
AvtoVAZ and several related companies, such as AvtoVAZagregat (a producer of car 
components that are used by AvtoVAZ).108 
The division between official and independent labor unions, as described in the previous 
section, is very visible in the case of the car industry in Tolyatti. The city is home to the labor 
union Edinstvo, which is the oldest independent labor union in the Russian motor industry. The 
union was born after a strike in September 1989, in which the traditional union sided with the 
management. Although the union has been active, not only in the Samara region but also in 
other regions, it is usually ignored by the AvtoVAZ management, and is not represented in the 
tripartite committee. In 2006, the head of Edinstvo, Pyotr Zolotaryov, found out about a 
meeting of the committee and tried to attend but was thrown out. As the union is excluded from 
the ‘official’ structures of social partnership, and found its rights to organize a strike restricted 
by the new Labor Code, it has resorted to protests meetings and pickets. Its potential for 
influence has shrunk, and so has the union’s membership: whereas the union counted 3425 
members in October 2000, the membership had fallen to a mere 300 persons in April 2010. 
The official automobile industry trade union in Tolyatti, ASM, dwarfs Edinstvo when it 
comes to its membership. The union has enormous resources to spend on social and welfare 
benefits and activities, and its ban on dual membership has prevented independent unions from 
flourishing. The union is represented in the tripartite committee, but its position is relatively 
weak: it admitted that it would only be able to achieve pay increases for the workers if this is 
combined with massive layoffs. Its policy, therefore, has been to strive for gradual wage 
increases, combined with reducing the number of jobs in line with ‘natural wastage’ (i.e. as 
workers leave the work force due to retirement). In practice, however, this meant a decline in 
real wages due to inflation, especially as the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 set in.109 
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Politics in the Samara region and the municipality of Tolyatti 
Politically, the Samara region remained integrated in the economic networks of the Russian 
state for the whole post-Soviet period, even as many other regions functioned as de facto 
autonomous fiefdoms of their governors. Because of the importance of its industry, the region 
was of great interest to the state. Regional politics was relatively competitive, and the region 
can be considered a ‘birthplace’ of many oligarchs (e.g. Boris Berezovsky and Yuriy 
Kachmazov). Small business was relatively successful in the region, and although a plethora 
of criminal groups was active, the region did not experience the same high degree of state 
collapse as many other regions in Russia. 110 
Konstantin Titov, a supporter of Yeltsin and member of the Nash Dom Rossiya party, was 
the region’s governor from 1991 to 2007; he was elected twice in partially competitive 
elections, and appointed once. Titov was critical towards Yeltsin’s successor and ran against 
Putin in the 2000 elections (receiving 20% of the vote in the Samara region, but only 1.5% of 
the national vote). Titov reconciled with Putin and kept his position as governor, which was 
extended by the president in 2005. However, in 2007, he was replaced by Vladimir Artyakov, 
a Edinaya Rossiya (‘United Russia’, ER) member. This can be seen as part of the instatement 
of Putin’s ‘power vertical’ over the regions. The position of governor became less political, 
and more ‘managerial’. It can also be considered an attempt to integrate the political and 
business elite: Artyakov was the head of AvtoVAZ between 2005 and 2007 and has extensive 
networks in the private sphere. He attempted to attract investments for the region’s industry 
and took measures to improve the efficiency of public spending, but was less interested in 
negotiations with the trade unions than his predecessor, refusing their proposals to increase the 
minimum wage above the federal level.111 During his term, Artyakov also set up a platform for 
interaction between civil society organizations and the regional government: the Civic 
Chamber. Among the objectives of this Chamber are the development of civil society 
institutions and the formulation of public opinion to bring it to the attention of the authorities. 
The counteraction of corruption, too, is mentioned as an objective. The chamber consists of 45 
members: fifteen of them are appointed by the governor, fifteen are appointed by the regional 
Duma. The remaining fifteen are appointed by the chamber itself. 112  In other words, the 
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composition of the chamber is entirely controlled by the government, which is likely to 
undermine its function as a true sound board between society and government.  
In 2012, Artyakov was replaced by Nikolai Merkushkin, who had been governor in 
Mordovia before. In that region, which is one of the poorest republics of the Russian 
Federation, he had managed to construct an authoritarian, centralized system of governance, 
strongly connected to the federal government. His governorship in the Samara region, however, 
turned out to be more problematic. Merkushkin’s attempts to govern in the same authoritarian 
manner as he had done in Mordovia were met with resistance, which led to a range of scandals 
that attracted national attention. In August 2016, he accused a woman who asked about the 
non-payment of salaries at AvtoVAZ of being instructed by the US ambassador, who had 
visited the region in April. He also suggested that Samara was the target of a plot by the CIA 
to overthrow the Russian government. These events were met by a public outcry and a petition 
on change.org, calling for a medical assessment of the governor’s mental health.113 Although 
many expected Merkushkin to be replaced, the Kremlin decided to keep him at this position;114 
apparently, Merkushkin’s loyalty to Moscow is deemed more valuable than his success as a 
governor. However, these scandals and his inadequacy as perceived by the media remain a 
liability for the regime.115 
Local politics in Tolyatti have been riddled with scandals, and organized crime, often 
connected to the problems at the AvtoVAZ plant, was widespread. In 2002, two editors of the 
local newspaper Tolyatti Observer were murdered, after the paper investigated a local 
corruption case; one of the victims was also a municipal council member. In 2007, the city’s 
major, Nikolai Utkin, was forced to resign after seven years in office and was imprisoned, after 
he became the subject of a corruption case.116 The subsequent mayoral election of 2009 can be 
considered an effort to extend the vertical of power to the municipal level. The most popular 
contenders were Aleksander Pushkov, the main engineer at AvtoVAZ and member of ER, and 
the independent candidate Sergei Andreev. Andreev, a Baptist minister, is a member of the 
‘December’ group of regional Duma deputies, which was established after a historically low 
turnout of 14.5% at the city council elections in August 2004.117 Andreev pledged to fight 
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corruption, promoted adherence to Western values and respect for human rights. 118  His 
message was picked up by Tolyatti’s residents: a VTsIOM survey suggested that a plurality 
(33.2%) of the respondents supported Andreev. Support for Pushkov was significantly lower 
at 25.3%.119 However, nine days before the election, Andreev was removed from the ballot in 
a court ruling, after he was convicted of breaking copyright law by using a photo of a local 
building in his campaign materials without the permission of the architect. 120  After that, 
Pushkov easily (69.23%) won the election against the only remaining serious contender, 
Edinstvo’s Pyotr Zolotaryov (13.54%).121 
The absurdity of the verdict that lead to Andreev’s exclusion might have very well been the 
basis for his later success. It seems that the election had undermined trust in the Edinaya 
Rossiya party: in the 2011 State Duma elections, Tolyatti was one of the municipalities where 
ER lost the position of largest party. Pushkov’s term as Tolyatti’s mayor was difficult, marked 
by the start of the global economic crisis, which lead to great job losses in Tolyatti. In 2011, 
Pushkov decided not to run again for the upcoming elections, and Andreev returned as a 
contender for the position of major of Tolyatti. His campaign, again, faced repression and 
‘black PR’ (he was, as a follower of a ‘non-traditional religion’, accused of being educated in 
the United States). However, his ER opponent, Alexander Shakhov, was unpopular with 
Tolyatti’s political elite due to his connections with organized crime groups. Fearing the 
prospect of increased influence of criminal groups under Shakhov, part of the elite chose 
Andreev’s side. The independent candidate managed to win the election with 57% of the 
vote.122 He became Tolyatti’s mayor in 2012. 
Although ER tried to avoid framing the election result as a loss for the Russian authorities, 
instead hailing it as ‘real elections, in which youth and charisma triumphed’,123 Andreev’s 
plans formed a departure from the ‘club rule’ of ER. During his mandate, he has tried to make 
the city administration more transparent by publishing the budgets of different local 
government departments and keeping a blog on LiveJournal and a page on VKontakte, on 
which he explains government decisions and activities in the town, such as the repair works on 
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Tolyatti’s roads.124 Andreev also worked to attract more investment to Tolyatti, meeting with 
representatives of European companies. 
Andreev rejects the title of ‘opposition mayor’ and he is forced to be extremely careful as 
an independent politician in a ER-dominated political environment. The party occupies 29 of 
the 35 seats in the city council, and has the power to enforce his resignation. The mayor seems 
to lack control over some of the municipal departments, after several of his team members were 
forced to leave their posts.  
On the regional level, governor Merkushkin was appointed one and a half month after 
Andreev was elected. After his election, the governor immediately started berating the mayors 
of the oblast for their inability to solve the problems in the cities, to gain support among the 
citizens of the oblast: a variation on the ‘good czar, bad boyars’ tactic as employed by president 
Putin. However, over time, Andreev managed to develop a good working relationship with the 
governor; the mayor understood that standing up to Merkushkin would improve neither his 
personal position, nor the situation in his city. However, working under the authoritarian 
Merkushkin, who demands that he be the only real political player in his region, has had a 
negative effect on Andreev’s image as a bringer of change: many of Tolyatti’s citizens started 
perceiving him as a powerless figure, and started looking at the governor in their hopes for 
positive change.125 
Andreev’s term ended in March 2017. He did not obtain a second term. In 2015, the regional 
authorities decided that candidates for the position would be selected by a specially created 
‘competition committee’, headed by the governor. The local Duma then chooses between these 
candidates.126 This will even further diminish the role of the mayor as a politician, and is 
another step in minimizing the interaction between the government and the citizens. Although, 
because of his effective working relationship with the governor, Andreev was still perceived 
to have a chance to stay for a second term, this did not happen.  
In the case of local politics in Tolyatti, we see the gradual extension the power of Edinaya 
Rossiya, and with that the vertical of power, to the lowest levels of government: during the 
mayoral elections in 2008, the independent candidate was barred from running in the election 
by the court. In 2011, Andreev could only win because part of the local political elite was 
unhappy with the candidate their own party floated. Now that mayoral elections are abolished, 
the power of ER over local politics in Tolyatti becomes even greater. 
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However, paradoxically, the extension of ER’s power does not mean that candidates from 
outside the party have no chance. The fact that Andreev was not dismissed during his term, 
even though the political environment is completely dominated by the party of power, shows 
that the political elite sees the benefit of having an outsider in an official position: after all, the 
fact that they are not part of the ‘club’ is a sign that they treat their job as more than just an 
asset, and are more genuine when it comes to improving the situation of their citizens. On the 
other hand, the ‘outsider mayor’ is not allowed to act as a real politician; his role is strictly that 
of ‘city manager’. As long as he fulfills that role effectively, he is of use to the political elite, 
but if he gets political ambitions, he could become a threat to them, and would probably be 
replaced. 
This strategy of ‘depoliticizing’ local government positions is not without danger: in the 
case of Tolyatti, many of the citizens clearly see that Andreev has little power, and that real 
power over the region resides with governor Merkushkin. This also means that, in crisis 
situations, anger will be directed not at the mayor, but at the governor. At a rally of workers 
and pensioners in March 2017, about 1500 protesters demanded the dismissal of the governor. 
In a declaration, the local branch of Russia’s Communist Party (KPRF), which organized the 
meeting, called Andreev ‘a key player of the governor’s team’.127 
In the following chapter, an acute crisis in Tolyatti will be described: the sudden closure of 
the factory of AvtoVAZagregat in July 2015, which led to protests by workers of this company 
and AvtoVAZ in general. This will give the possibility to analyze what kind of actions citizens 
can undertake, and in which way the authorities and other actors respond to this. 
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CHAPTER IV: SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS: THE CASE OF 
AVTOVAZ 
During the Soviet era, working at Tolyatti’s AvtoVAZ was prestigious: as one of the most 
productive car manufacturers in the world in the 1970s and ‘80s, its Lada cars were sold in 
many communist countries. In contrast to other automotive giants, AvtoVAZ produced most 
of its components itself, which was not uncommon for Soviet companies. However, as the 
Soviet era ended, AvtoVAZ encountered great difficulties. The company was privatized in 
1992. In the years 1993-5, several joint-stock companies that would act as suppliers to 
AvtoVAZ were formed, as part of the company’s adaptation to a market economy. However, 
as supervision was lacking, many of these ‘supplier companies’ were created with an unclear 
purpose, and were often used by their founders (often AvtoVAZ executives) to bring company 
assets under their own control. At the same time, car production fell with 30% and the company 
lost much of its share on the Russian car market to second-hand imports.128 
For the Russian government, AvtoVAZ, an employer of 120.000 people, was too big to fail, 
and rescue packages were issued to help it survive and stimulate restructuring. The 1998 
devaluation of the ruble proved beneficial for the company, and as the Russian car market 
expanded in the early 2000s, AvtoVAZ managed to maintain its production volume, but 
steadily lost its market share. As part of Putin’s economic transformation, AvtoVAZ was 
nationalized again in 2005 as state corporation Rostekhnologii obtained the majority of shares. 
In 2009. Putin (then prime minister) saved the company, which was selling its cars at a loss, 
by injecting $2.5 billion. The Russian state decided to hand over its control to the company to 
Renault-Nissan, and in 2012, the Franco-Japanese partnership obtained more than 50 percent 
of the shares of the company. This proved a successful decision: under a new management, 
production increased and the company started making profits again. However, the success was 
short-lived: as the Russian economy came to a standstill because of the erosion of property 
rights, the plummeting oil price and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the following 
international sanctions, the sales of AvtoVAZ plummeted and the company suffered a record 
loss, making its future survival uncertain again.129 
 
                                                 
128 M. Glazunov, Business in post-Communist Russia : privatisation and the limits of transformation (London: 
Routledge, 2013). 
129 S. Aleksašenko, "Čto xorošo «Žiguljam» – xorošo dlja Rossii? Možno li spasti AvtoVAZ," Republic.ru 
2016. 
  
34 
 
The bankruptcy of AvtoVAZagregat: from ‘fake news’ to civil action 
Although AvtoVAZ itself has been kept afloat time and time again by the government, this 
cannot be said about some of its supplier companies. Under the new, foreign management, 
AvtoVAZ started producing cars based on Renault models, often with parts that are produced 
abroad – a break from its Soviet structure. As a result, supplier companies that depended on 
AvtoVAZ for their existence got into severe trouble, leading to a great loss of jobs and even 
bankruptcy. 
In June 2015, AvtoVAZagregat (AVA), AvtoVAZ’s largest supplier company, consisting 
of a main company and three daughter companies, stopped its production after an agreement 
with AvtoVAZ was cancelled. The reasons for the breakdown of the agreement were unclear. 
However, the consequences were large: the company’s 2300 workers suddenly found 
themselves without salary, even though, according to Russian law, workers are entitled to two-
thirds of their original salary if production is stopped. Under financial hardship, many workers 
struggled to survive, and were sometimes forced to take bank loans at high interest rates, just 
to be able to buy food.130 
When two months later, on August 10, it became clear that AvtoVAZ was unwilling to take 
over the assets and workforce of its ailing supplier, workers decided to act. On social network 
VKontakte, the following message was posted: “Tomorrow at 11 o’clock, there will be a rally 
at AvtoVAZagregat. It is said that the governor and television will come. The questions 
regarding the payment of vacation money and salaries will be resolved. To anyone to whom 
this is important: come!!”.131 
 Of course, neither the local and regional government, nor the management of AVA had 
organized such a rally. Merkushkin had no plans to attend, and neither had any other 
government official. However, some workers heeded the call and went to the factory. The rally 
also drew the attention of a local TV station. Government officials were afraid that the call 
would have serious consequences, and deputy mayor Alexei Buzinnyi decided that he would 
organize an event with the workers the next day. The local TV station later reported that ‘the 
unsanctioned rally was absolutely peaceful and ended quickly’, and that the workers ‘got hope 
that the difficult situation would be resolved well’.132 
In the meeting, Buzinnyi promised that the next day, an event with the head of the 
department of social support would be held, in which the workers would obtain more 
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information about their rights. However, the very same day, the event was postponed to August 
17.133 
By that time, workers had formed the ‘Workers’ Initiative Group AvtoVAZagretat’, led by 
long-time employee Antonina Larina. She represented the workers’ interests at a meeting on 
August 13 at the public prosecutor's office, in which the debt of AVA towards to workers was 
determined and a legal investigation was started. 134  The meeting was ignored by the 
management of the company. It is striking that, although representatives of several government 
agencies were present at the meeting, none of the trade unions (neither ASM, nor Edinstvo) 
seem to have taken part in it. In the July and September editions of the newspaper of ASM 
(‘Vesti Profsoyuza’), the case is not mentioned.135 Instead, the July edition stresses the need to 
work together with the management of AvtoVAZ, given the difficult situation on the 
automobile market. This underscores the fact that these unions do not see it as their task to take 
a confrontational stance towards the management, and prefer the ‘we are all in the same boat’ 
narrative.136 
When the meeting with the management was about to take place, it was postponed again, as 
the general director of the company, Viktor Kozlov, was not in town. However, as the accounts 
of the company had been frozen and the future of the company was unclear, the management 
was forced to come and offer an explanation. On August 20, a meeting between the workers 
and the management of AVA finally took place. Kozlov declared that the final decision about 
the future of the company would be made ‘sometime in the beginning of September’. When it 
came to the payment of salaries, the general director advised the workers to let the judge decide 
about that, since several workers had already started a legal case.137 The representative of the 
local government, Marina Bratanova, promised the workers that they would get financial 
assistance to pay their bills. On the same day, governor Merkushkin commented on the case 
for the first time, saying that he would ‘have the issue resolved’.138 
The meeting did not pacify the workers. On the contrary, while wages remained unpaid and 
the final decision about the fate of the company was postponed, rumors spread that 
management members were trying to sell AVA’s assets to line their own pockets before 
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bankruptcy was declared, anger among the workers grew. Some were even convinced that the 
management had deliberately led the company to bankruptcy, to sell its assets.139 Their anger 
was not only directed at AVA’s management, but also at AvtoVAZ and its Swedish CEO Bo 
Andersson: after all, it was the breakdown of the agreement with AvtoVAZ that led to the 
ongoing crisis. The government authorities were accused of not doing enough to prevent a 
social catastrophe. The official trade union ASM declared that it was unable to get into contact 
with the management, and advised the workers to search for another job.140 
At this point, the case started attracting the attention of other civil society actors. On 
September 8, the local department of the Russian Communist Party (KPRF) organized a rally 
(sanctioned by the local authorities), which attracted more than 500 people. Antonina Larina 
attended the rally, as well as Pyotr Zolotaryov, the former head of Edinstvo. Under a sea of red 
flags, the protesters demanded that the outstanding wages be payed immediately, and that the 
government take full control of the company, checking the management’s every action. The 
government, too, was heavily criticized: leading KPRF members said that the United Russia 
party had lead the country’s industry to crisis.141 At this point, the case also started attracting 
the attention of national media outlets, such as newspaper Kommersant and the popular news 
website gazeta.ru. 
A lot of action, but few results 
The outspoken support of a sizeable systemic actor as KPRF gave the workers of 
AvtoVAZagregat the confidence to press their demands in a more aggressive way. Antonina 
Larina said that she was willing to block the M-5, the highway that connects Tolyatti to Samara. 
The momentum was increased even further when local news website tltgorod.ru reported that 
at AvtoVAZ, ten to twenty thousand people would soon lose their jobs.142 Edinstvo started 
planning a new rally on September 20 and demanded that AvtoVAZ be nationalized again, and 
that workers’ salaries would be increased by 20%.143 The choice of the date was a sensitive 
one: opposition leader Alexei Navalny had called for mass protests against the authorities on 
that very date, as it almost coincided with the fourth anniversary of the so-called ‘castling’.144 
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The local authorities therefore decided not to sanction the rally. Edinstvo’s leader, Igor 
Vitushchenko, decided not to fight the decision to avoid accusations of being a ‘fifth 
columnist’. The rally was postponed to September 27.145 
Although the protest seemed to gain momentum and spread to workers of AvtoVAZ itself, 
the local authorities remained inert. On September 15, mayor Andreev held a meeting with 
citizens, in which he would answer questions from citizens. According to a journalist of local 
newspaper The Free City, the mayor tried to gain the sympathy of the attendants, avoided 
difficult questions using jokes and charm, and explained the inactivity of the local government 
by a lack of money – noting that a considerable part of the inhabitants does not pay for public 
utilities.146 To keep the momentum going, some resorted to extreme measures: Alexei Krasnov, 
a KPRF city council member, took his folding chair to the central square, sat down, and 
declared a hunger strike. He was later joined by Edinstvo member Viacheslav Shepelyov. 
When Krasnov was asked what exactly he asked from the local government, he answered: 
“First of all, that they explain themselves to the people. (…) Mayor Andreev should tell his 
voters: ‘Dear people! I found out everything. The salary of this-and-this sum will be payed…’ 
Or ‘I am sorry, but I cannot do anything in this situation…’”147  
Krasnov’s answer illustrates the difficult phase the protest had reached. On the one hand, 
the backing of important players as KPRF and Edinstvo, and the publicity the case had obtained 
in the media gave the protesters a strong position: it made it impossible for the government to 
simply forbid the protests. On the other hand, it remained unclear what the workers could 
achieve with rallies and media actions: it was not in the government’s interest to nationalize an 
ailing company in crisis time, and it would certainly not make the plant more efficient. The 
local government pointed at the fact that the legal investigation was in the hands of the 
prosecutor, and that the workers had already received some emergency support. The regional 
government declared that it would only give financial support in the case of mass layoffs.148 
The rally on September 27, 2015 attracted 700 to 1500 people: far more than planned.149 
The rally was organized by KPRF and Edinstvo. Although participants held banners expressing 
support to the workers of AVA, the theme of the rally was broader: the ‘asocial policies’ of the 
leadership of AvtoVAZ, which had laid off thousands of workers earlier that year, and was 
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expected to shed more workers soon. Although the government was criticized, most of the 
anger was directed at Viktor Kozlov and Bo Andersson. Antonina Larina accused Kozlov of 
stealing the money of the workers, and it was demanded that he be punished and ‘give the 
factory back to the workers’. Andersson was criticized as being a typical capitalist, who had 
no social obligations towards the workers, but wanted to buy AvtoVAZ for little money and 
turn it into a simple ‘screwdriver department’ (otvyortochnyi tsekh) of the long Renault-Nissan 
assembly line, that would not produce cars, but simply assemble them from imported parts. 
The protesters felt nostalgia for the time that AvtoVAZ was a state company (in 2005), ‘before 
the plant was handed to the foreigners’.150 
Did all the protest yield any results? It did seem to wake up some other actors, but it is 
doubtful whether this helped the workers. The council members of Edinaya Rossiya expressed 
their concerns about the situation and invited both general director Kozlov and the head of the 
official trade union, Kuznetsov, to their meeting. Kozlov did not attend, Kuznetsov did. The 
politicians adopted several ‘recommendations’ towards the local government about optimizing 
the distribution of social help. They also expressed the intention to start an inquiry into the 
news of new layoffs at AvtoVAZ, to answer the question “why the factory has not overcome 
this negative news”.151 ASM organized its own rally on October 7. There were no red flags 
here, but flags with the AvtoVAZ logo and flags with the Russian tricolor. The organizers 
barely sought to motivate people to come, received little attention from news outlets. The rally 
was later mocked in local media: protesters appeared to have no idea what they were doing 
there and were constantly looking at their watches. The speeches were read from paper, without 
any expression.152 One of the demands was ‘legislation that allows agreements between the 
employers and the trade union, to provide special privileges only to members of the union’.153 
The tripartite committee, which met in September 29, did not address the issue directly, 
according to the meeting minutes.154 
The bankruptcy case moved forward, albeit sluggishly. On October 8, the official 
bankruptcy procedure was started. A few weeks later, Kozlov met with mayor Andreev and 
several regional politicians, and announced that he would make sure that the debts from the 
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months July to September towards the workers would be paid before November 15, and the 
rest before the end of the year.155 
The communists of KPRF tried to maintain the attention of the authorities and general 
population, but encountered more and more difficulties. One of the hunger strikers, Viacheslav 
Shepelyov, was fired from his job. The authorities started to consider the protests more and 
more of a nuisance. On October 22 and 23, the city was holding the event ‘The city of the 
future’ (Gorod budushchego) to showcase the ‘shining perspectives’ of the town. It goes 
without saying that the ongoing protests were an eyesore to the local authorities. A mass picket 
at the event was forbidden.  Krasnov, who had stopped his hunger strike because he ‘wanted 
to focus on more effective methods’, started a picket in Samara, hoping to raise enthusiasm for 
a rally in the regional capital on the October 27. The turnout became a disappointment: only 
about a hundred protesters went to the rally.156 A KPRF rally in Tolyatti on November 7, the 
anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution, drew no more than 500 protesters. Workers of 
AvtoVAZ were reported to be under threat of losing their jobs if they attended the protest, and 
many figured that this was too great a risk.157 The AvtoVAZ workers might have lost interest 
in mass protesting, given the fact that the process of bankruptcy had already started and Kozlov 
had promised to pay the debts to the workers by the end of the year.158 
The promise was not kept: the workers were indeed reported to have received some money, 
but far less than promised. According to Antonina Larina, each of the workers had received 
only 132 rubles in November.159 However, whereas in earlier months local media repeatedly 
reported about protest actions and plans for protests, it seems that the enthusiasm for large-
scale protests among the workers and their supporters had died out, even though the main 
activists of KPRF continued emphasizing that “the only thing that can help the inhabitants of 
Tolyatti, is a mass protest, a series of protest actions.”160 Many of the workers decided that it 
was better to spend energy on survival methods: growing vegetables on the dacha and doing 
unofficial work. The local KPRF department founded a new ‘independent’ trade union, 
MOLOT, which would be headed by Shepelyov.161 
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KPRF/MOLOT changed its strategy from organizing rallies to more subtle ways of 
generating media attention. One of the methods was inviting media outlets for ‘excursions’ to 
the homes of the families of the AVA workers, who had been virtually without wages for five 
months now. Showing the poignant poverty in which they lived could help spread awareness 
among citizens, which could strengthen calls for action. The success of this strategy was 
limited: most stories only appeared in local news media and smaller outlets like Novaya Gazeta. 
Furthermore, MOLOT tried to gain access to the closed AVA workplace to obtain evidence of 
the theft of assets, but were denied access.162 Attempts to move forward in legal processes were 
slowed down by red tape measures: the court demanded that workers obtain a declaration from 
the management of AVA, stating that they had not received their salary. However, the 
management was unwilling to give their workers those declarations – giving as an excuse that 
the only one who could sign it, Kozlov, was said to be out of town. The management reckoned 
that the workers would eventually lose faith and resign themselves. A third field in which 
MOLOT was active, was emergency aid: parcels with food were given to those families that 
were hit hardest by the situation.163 
Shifting the blame: the government reaction 
Although the protests had decreased in intensity by November 2015, they nonetheless 
seemed to have made higher government circles aware of the risk of rising popular discontent 
in Tolyatti. The September 27 rally had shown that there was a risk of a snowball effect: the 
rally was organized in support of AVA employees, but had attracted large numbers of 
AvtoVAZ workers who feared the prospect of further rounds of layoffs, and disagreed with the 
policy of the foreign management to turn AvtoVAZ into a ‘conventional’ part of Renault-
Nissan. On November 10, Kommersant, Vedomosti and other major news outlets reported about 
increasing disagreement between majority shareholder Renault-Nissan and minority 
shareholder Rostec,164 a state company headed by Sergei Chemezov, a longtime friend of 
president Putin and one of the most influential men of the country.165 
Chemezov sharply criticized Andersson’s policy, saying that “it is necessary to be more 
careful and considerate”. He said that the policy of large-scale layoffs was “probably European 
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practice, but we think that it should not be done in Russia”.166 He announced that he would 
discuss the issue with Renault-Nissan at the meeting of the board of directors on November 30. 
According to him, “the question of replacing the CEO is not yet on the table, but some 
educational work needs to be carried out.”167 At the meeting on November 30, the board of 
directors failed to agree on the budget for the next year. The press service of the company 
announced that “AvtoVAZ took the decision to continue the work on the budget for 2016, 
adding supplementary measures directed at increasing the profitability of the company, 
supporting social stability and the supporting the core team.” 168  To prevents layoffs, the 
management planned to introduce a four-day working week. The situation attracted the 
attention of the national government; deputy prime minister Arkady Dvorkovich declared that 
the government was aware of the problem, and that he would soon go to Tolyatti to discuss the 
problems.169 
Publicly taking such a harsh stance against Andersson benefited Chemezov and the Russian 
authorities in several ways. Apart from being a show of strength, the action also cemented the 
narrative that the foreign management was to blame for the company’s malaise. Among 
employees, ‘that American’ (as workers called the Swedish CEO) had already become deeply 
unpopular, and Chemezov’s declaration amplified this critique, whereas the structural causes 
of the malaise (such as the old-fashioned structure of the plant and the corruption) moved to 
the background. Moreover, his remarks suggested that in the first place AvtoVAZ, and not the 
state, was responsible for the well-being of the employees after dismissal, thereby shifting 
blame from the failing government institutions to the company management. 
The communists joined Chemezov in his criticism of Andersson. In January, State Duma 
member Leonid Kalashnikov published a long letter in which he accused Andersson (‘a foreign 
citizen’) of ‘destroying the company’ by dropping local suppliers and favoring foreign 
companies and consultants. He complained about the fact that ‘Alliance Rostec Auto B.V.’ (the 
mother company of AvtoVAZ, in which Renault-Nissan is the majority shareholder) is 
registered in the Netherlands, a NATO member state. Kalashnikov accused prime minister 
Medvedev (who had visited Tolyatti that month and made a ride in a new Lada XRAY) and 
Rostec of closing their eyes to the problems of AvtoVAZ and AVA workers. He ended his 
letter by accusing Andersson of being guilty of sabotage and espionage, and expressed the hope 
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that president Putin (whom Andersson ‘misled’) would take action.170 Edinstvo took a similar 
stance, and demanded that the state take responsibility by nationalizing the company, ‘since 
the management was misbehaving.’171 Viktor Kozlov, too, joined the criticism in an interview 
with The Samara Review, saying that the cancellation of the deal with AVA (which lead to the 
company’s bankruptcy) was a ‘huge mistake’, by which “Andersson consciously or 
unconsciously caused a loss of 750 million for his company.”172 
Although the criticism of Andersson’s policy was widely shared, some were critical of 
Chemezov’s motives. One retired AvtoVAZ employee, Yuriy Tselikov, criticized Chemezov 
in an interview with local newspaper The Free City. He considered Chemezov’s criticism 
insincere, as in April 2015, the head of Rostec had praised Andersson’s policy. According to 
Tselikov, Chemezov just wanted to distance himself from AvtoVAZ’s CEO, as Putin would 
hold him partly responsible if the situation in Tolyatti would escalate.173  
Whether the wave of criticism towards Andersson was justified or not, it severely damaged 
the position of the CEO of AvtoVAZ; a position that was already precarious due to the losses 
the company had suffered in 2015. On February 28, Vedomosti reported that both Rostec and 
Renault-Nissan sought to replace him. According to several sources close to the company, the 
shareholders of the company were actively searching for a new top manager.174 On March 11, 
Andersson declared that he would leave AvtoVAZ on April 7. 
The governor intervenes 
Nicolas Maure, who had been the head of the Romanian car producer Dacia, became the new 
CEO of AvtoVAZ. Although it was unlikely that the economic situation would improve soon, 
and although some (such as the communist Kalashnikov) complained about the fact that ‘again 
a foreigner’ was going to lead the company, the immediate threat of a AvtoVAZ-wide protest 
had been removed. The media outlet Lenta.ru noted that Maure had successfully resolved a 
labor conflict in Romania by reaching a compromise with the trade union.175 This new hope of 
a solution helped temporarily pacify the protest. 
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The case of the bankruptcy of AvtoVAZagregat and the payment of the wages was still not 
resolved. The ownership of the company was shade: the majority of issued shares was held by 
‘KopperBerg Ltd’, registered on the British Virgin Islands, and most likely, the money with 
which the debts could have been paid had disappeared through this offshore company. 
However, the case continued to generate media attention, which prompted governor 
Merkushkin to act. Viktor Kozlov was arrested at an airport in Moscow. Merkushkin then 
summoned Alexei Kozlov (majority shareholder of KopperBerg Ltd and brother of the general 
director of AVA) to Samara and forced him to sign a declaration that he would pay all the 
unpaid wages to the workers of AVA before March 31, 2016. Then, Viktor was released. The 
regional government also provided a one-time ‘social benefit’ of 10.000 rubles. A new legal 
case was opened against the despised CEO of AVA. Merkushkin received praise from the 
regional union of trade unions, for acting decisively. Antonina Larina, too, thanked the 
governor for his support.176 
Indeed, in March, the workers of the main branch of AvtoVAZagregat had received their 
salaries. However, the 700 workers of its three daughter companies (AvtoVAZagregatplast, 
PoshivAvtoVAZagregat and AvtoVAZagregattrans) still had not received their salaries, and 
despite promises from the governor, these were not paid for the next months. When in the end 
of August 2016, a worker of PoshivAvtoVAZagregat confronted Merkushkin with the fact that 
they had not been paid for a full year, the governor reacted angrily, and accused the woman of 
being ‘stirred up’ by foreign agents, and reminded that he himself had broken the law to help 
them, to give them the social benefit of 10.000 rubles.177 The conversation was recorded and 
placed online, which lead to an outcry that reached national media outlets. A few days later, on 
August 29, some workers decided to take radical action, and blocked the M5 highway between 
Tolyatti and Samara. The case damaged the reputation of the governor, and in the following 
months, KPRF turned against him and demanded his replacement.178 
The action on the highway attracted no more than 80 people, and was ended quickly. A day 
later, on August 30, 2016, AVA was officially declared bankrupt. At the moment of writing 
(April 2017), the debts towards the employees of the daughter companies have still not been 
paid. 
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CHAPTER V: PROTECTING NATURE AS A CAUSE FOR CIVIL ACTION 
Evans (2012) noted that action against concrete problems to achieve clear-cut goals appeal to 
far more people than general protests for civil rights. The protection of nature is an important 
cause for such action: the clearing of forests and natural areas to make place for new building 
activity affects people directly, and preventing the destruction of natural areas is both a clear-
cut goal and an aim that evokes a positive response from a large part of society.179 It is therefore 
no surprise that quite a lot of scholarly activity has been focused on this kind of civil society 
activity. 
Among the most notable protests against deforestation were those in the ‘green belt’ around 
Moscow, especially the protests in defense of the Khimki Forest. There, protests started in 
2007, in response to government plans to build a highway straight through the forest. At first, 
protests were oppressed violently, and journalists who published articles criticizing the plans 
were beaten up. Despite the oppression, the protesters managed to attract more and more media 
attention. In August 2010, protesters held a rally on Pushkin Square in Moscow. At this point, 
members of the Russian political elite started to express their concerns about the controversy, 
and the same month, the leadership of Edinaya Rossiya asked president Medvedev to suspend 
the construction project, which he did. 
When Medvedev later still approved the construction, the protest movement became more 
politicized, aimed at, as one of the protesters stated, “the replacement of the political order”. 
Political scientists argued that this could be a more general pattern for Russian grassroots civil 
movements: when they are organized around a very concrete issue that directly affects people’s 
lives, these protest movements are able to obtain media attention and grow fast. When there is 
a direct confrontation between the authorities and the protest movement (as was the case in the 
Khimki Forest protests), the movement can become politicized, and redefine their goals more 
in opposition the existing political order.180 
Although Tolyatti is a far smaller city than Moscow, it has faced similar issues regarding 
the preservation of nature. The city is divided in three districts (Rayony): Avtozavodskiy rayon, 
Tsentral’nyy rayon and Komsomolskiy rayon. The districts lie approximately in a half-circle. 
In the middle of this half-circle, on the banks of the Volga river, there is the ‘microdistrict’ 
(mikrorayon) Portposyolok. In and around the microdistrict, there are parks with cottages, 
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owned by (and only accessible for) the elite.181 Between the different parts of Tolyatti, there 
are sizeable areas of forest. 
In July and August 2010, fires destroyed more than a thousand hectares of forest. The 
destruction sparked civic activity: citizens started organizing on social media and organized 
planting events. The initiative was supported by media outlets (such as the local radio station 
‘Avtoradio Tolyatti’) and politicians, and in October, Avtoradio reported that 600 new trees 
had been planted. 182  Even though there was cooperation between citizens and the local 
government, several citizens remained suspicious of the government’s plans: on social media, 
rumors circulated that on former forest areas, the construction of new cottages was planned. 
The plan of the mayor to lease damaged forest areas to private parties, who were supposed to 
help in restoring the forest, caused more suspicions: if third parties were interested in renting a 
plot of forest land, they would certainly want to make use of it. Although the forest was 
managed by the local authorities, the ownership and protection status of much of it was not 
clearly defined, and citizens feared that third parties would start constructing cottages for 
private use. According to the authorities, this fear was unfounded, given that the Forestry Code 
forbids the construction of housing in forest areas. 183 
During the period of forest fires in 2010, several public groups were created on VKontakte, 
Russia’s most popular social networking site. A few of them still exist today; the largest one 
(under the name ‘Help to save the forest in Tolyatti’184)  still has a member count of almost 
4500 people. The community is rather young – many members are in their twenties. Some non-
citizen actors, such as the local department of Edinaya Rossiya and newspaper Molodyozhaya 
Gazeta are also active in the group. Although the group was initially meant to quickly spread 
information about the forest fires, the group was later used to organize events, such as a tree 
planting event on June 12 (Russia Day) of 2013. With some regularity, links to petitions (on 
change.org, or on the Russian website of Greenpeace) were posted, often aimed at improving 
the protection of the forest or preventing the clearing of certain areas of forest. Posts also 
diverge to different topics unrelated to the original subject of the group, such as calls to find a 
home for stray dogs. There are periods when these groups are virtually silent; in some periods, 
nothing is posted for months. 
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Another way in which citizens interacted during the period of forest fires was via blogs. In 
Russia, LifeJournal, a blogging platform with social networking features, is especially popular. 
Popular bloggers can become very influential – opposition politician Alexei Navalny became 
prominent thanks to his LifeJournal blog. Tolyatti, too, has popular blogs, such as Zapiski 
gorozhanina (‘Notes of a townsman’) of journalist Fyodor Bystrov.185 In the summer of 2010, 
he was one of the initiators of a petition, calling for the resignation of mayor Anatoli Pushkov. 
In the petition, the mayor was accused of not having reacted effectively to the danger of forest 
fires: he did not take preventive measures, even though already in spring, ecologists had warned 
that inaction would have serious consequences. When Bystrov and other initiators tried to 
personally offer the petition to the mayor at the town hall at a regular press meeting, they were 
not allowed to enter.186 The mayor later responded to the petition, calling the accusations 
‘absolutely unfounded’.187 
There is some activity of environmental NGOs on the local level. Several grassroots 
organizations exist, although it is unclear how organized these groups are – some groups that 
present themselves as ‘organizations’ (such as ‘ecological youth organization eKoisTY’188), 
turn out to be little more than small groups of enthusiasts who are willing to put energy in 
setting up an organization, but lose interest after some time. More stable, usually, are the 
organizations that are part of a nationwide network. An example is the movement 
‘No.More.Garbage’ (‘Musora.Bolshe.Net’), which describes itself as ‘a network of initiative 
groups’, organizes cleaning activities, stimulates waste sorting, and tree planting days:189 non-
political and uncontroversial activities. A more politicized organization is the Social-
Ecological Union. This organization, which was founded in 1991, cooperates with Greenpeace 
and WWF to push for more ecologically friendly policy. The organization has sharply 
expressed its concerns about the labelling of ecological organizations as ‘foreign agents’, and 
appealed to president Putin to stop the prosecution of such organizations.190 The union itself 
does not appear on the list of ‘foreign agents’, and the leader of the Samara regional branch, 
Sergei Simak, was also a member of the regional Civic Chamber from 2008 until 2014, a 
platform for civil society organizations (as mentioned in chapter III).  
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From construction to planting: the state in charge 
The period of forest fires had led to interpersonal contacts and engagement with the case of 
preserving the forest. To protect the forests from being cleared, citizens of Tolyatti decided to 
organize ‘thematic walks’ through the forest. As this was not an official rally, the citizens were 
not obliged to ask permission from the local government: people just brought their children 
and enjoyed the walk along the affected parts of the forest. There was no real organizational 
structure or environmental organization that stimulated these actions, but many of the 
participants of the walks had helped in the fight against the forest fires. The idea that the forest 
they had so fervidly tried to rescue would have to make place for new buildings was 
inacceptable to them.191 The case for the protection of Tolyatti’s forest drew the attention of 
Anatoli Ivanov, a State Duma member of Edinaya Rossiya, representing the Samara Oblast, 
said that he had received numerous complaints about the clearing of the forest, even in parts 
that were not damaged by fire. He requested that a local attorney consider the situation, to 
check if the reports were factual, and whether the clearing was legal.192 
Even though local authorities in Tolyatti kept emphasizing that all the forest areas that were 
damaged by the fire would be restored, there were strong signals that they were changing their 
position. In November, Aleksei Kiriyenko, a member of the regional Duma, told Kommersant 
that ‘a polemic was kindled’ on the possibility of urban development on the forest areas. Sergei 
Simak noted that there were plans to build a road through the forest between Avtozavodskiy 
rayon and Tsentral’nyy rayon, and suggested that the fact that a forest fire had raged there was 
not a coincidence, as the destruction of the trees could give the local authorities the right to 
start construction. However, he warned that if the government would indeed take the decision 
to build a road, this could lead to a ‘Khimki situation’, as many of the inhabitants were opposed 
to it.193 
On December 29, it looked as if the fears started to become reality: the mayor approved a 
plan to change the zoning of one of the burned forest areas, to allow the construction of major 
infrastructure. Simak saw it as the first step towards the disappearance of the entire forest area, 
and noted that citizens and State Duma members were opposed to the plan. He insisted that the 
forest should obtain the status of national park. However, it cannot be said that all Tolyattians 
were unhappy about the plans: some inhabitants close to the selected area were looking forward 
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to the development of new infrastructure. According to the plans, the roads would be repaired, 
and there would be new facilities, such as a school and a GP. In March 2011, the Prosecutor’s 
office intervened. The office declared that the area was not owned by the local government, 
and issued a warning to mayor Pushkov that the plan was illegal.194 
In April 2011, the Tolyatti authorities started to try to bring the forests under the ownership 
of the local government, reasoning that this would allow them to maintain and protect them 
more effectively. This would also allow the local government to allocate these areas to 
construction projects.195 However, this process turned out to be lengthy: only in June 2014, the 
documents for the transfer of ownership were signed, and even then, the construction plan was 
still controversial. 196  The most immediate threat to the forest areas was therefore not 
construction, but neglect. The regional government gave the right to remove the dead trees to 
commercial organizations: the faster the trees were removed, the more money the companies 
would receive. However, according to Simak, the government did not provide enough materials 
and equipment to plant new trees: he warned that inaction could lead to insect plagues the next 
year.197 
As the government did not plant trees itself, people were called to action. On Friday, April 
22, 2011, such a day took place. It was organized by the regional ecological company EkoVoz 
and local radio station Avtoradio. The movement ‘No.More.Garbage’ also helped organizing. 
Many volunteers were enthusiastic about the initiative, but complained that it was planned on 
a working day. Calls from volunteers to move the event to the weekend were ignored. 
Participants reported that teachers brought large amounts of school children to the event, just 
‘to tick the box’ (‘dlya galochki’). Although some participants were enthusiastic and asked 
when the next planting event would be, others were disappointed. One of the participant called 
it an ‘empty event’, and announced that he would never attend such an event anymore.198 A 
similar event was held the Monday after: there, workers of the company ‘Tolyattikauchuk’ 
went to the damaged areas to plant new trees.199 
This is the kind of ‘civil society activity’ that was characteristic for the restoration of the 
forest: although there were a lot of citizens that were genuinely willing to help, much of the 
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activity was organized by companies and state institutions which coerced people to take part. 
Also, the social media groups that were founded by grassroots activists became more and more 
dominated by commercial and state organizations (in Russia, private organizations are often 
dominated by the state). Although this is the kind of ‘civil society’ of which the Russian 
authorities openly state that they want to develop it (e.g. through platforms like the Civic 
Chamber), it is difficult to classify these activities as ‘society-based’: on the contrary, by 
‘recruiting’ some of the initial grassroots activists and estranging others, the state leaves very 
little space for citizens to remain in charge of their own actions as citizens. 
Protesting forest clearance: the return of civil society, or conflicts within the elite? 
The ‘colonization’ of the forest protection movement by the state, in which the planting of 
new trees by citizens was emphasized instead of protesting against building plans, continued 
in the years following 2011. However, this does not mean that the protest had faded away 
entirely. Although the construction plan from December 2010 was stalled, the local 
government allowed several parts of the city forest to be cleared to make place for construction. 
This regularly led to protests. In February 2015, the city administration of mayor Andreev 
decided to allow the clearance of 500 to 600 trees on two locations in the western part of the 
Komsomolskiy rayon, to allow the construction of a hotel and a housing complex.200 According 
to the general allocation plan of the town, one of the plots (near ulitsa Chaikinoy) was a ‘town 
forest’; however, to make way for the construction, its status was changed.201 The reasoning 
behind the decision remains unclear. The other plot (near ulitsa Yesenina) was already marked 
as a zone for urban development in the general plan of the city, even though there is a small 
forest. 
Citizens appealed on the town council to prevent the clearance, and found support with local 
deputy Borislav Grinblat. Grinblat is a former ally of mayor Andreev in the regional Duma, as 
part of the ‘December’ group. However, because of disagreements about the political 
orientation of the group, a conflict arose between Grinblat and Andreev. In 2014, Grinblat said 
in an interview with local newspaper Ponedelnik that he would never shake hands with 
Andreev anymore. As a member of the town council, Grinblat accused Andreev of ‘selling 
fairytales’ to improve Tolyatti’s image, whereas in fact, the city was stagnating and corruption 
was rampant. Although Grinblat used to criticize Edinaya Rossiya in the past, he has become 
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part of the ER fraction in the city council. He stated that ER is “the only party that can resist 
the corrupt lawlessness that currently exists in the executive branch”.202 
Several citizens were genuinely concerned about the construction plans. However, for 
Grinblat and ER, the aversion to the mayor and the fact that the party had tried to brand itself 
as a protector of the forest (e.g. by organizing tree-planting days and calling for a moratorium 
on forest clearing in the town council) formed a strong political motivation to oppose the plans. 
On June 22, 2015, the town council reported (via a news article on their website) that deputies 
and inhabitants had acted together to protect the trees. The commission for urban development, 
headed by Grinblat, declared that the clearing violated the general allocation plan of the city, 
and that the mayor had exceeded his powers. A month later, after the working group had 
discussed the problem with residents of the district, council members issued an appeal to the 
mayor to stop the destruction of the forest.203 They also wanted the mayor to change the zoning, 
so that any major construction on either of the sites would become illegal.204 The mayor argued 
that he could not cancel the permission to clear the forest for construction, which was issued 
months earlier, pointing out that in a similar case where the mayor had done so, this had resulted 
in criminal cases for ‘obstruction of entrepreneurial activity’.205 
So far, the most vocal opposition against the construction plan had come from the city 
council. However, in September and October, there were signs that civil society started to 
become more active. Activist and blogger Natasha Kozlovskaya reported on her blog that 
Grinblat had drawn her attention to the case. She stated that the construction plan was part of 
a corrupt scheme, in which local government officials line their pockets by allowing 
construction in forest areas.206 On social media, Grinblat and others started calling for protest 
actions.207 
On October 5, the first protest action started, in the form of a picketing. About forty people, 
mostly pensioners and students, went to the town hall, carrying signs with texts like ‘Mayor, 
we were not waiting for such a thing!’ and ‘In Tolyatti, we need a garden town, and corrupt 
officials need a kick in the butt!’. What immediately stands out, is the quality of the signs: they 
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were well-printed and all had the same design. The protesters also held a long banner, with 
photos of Sergei Yesenin and Liza Chaikina (the persons after whom the streets were named). 
The fact that such a small protest, the very first one about this case, was so well-organized, 
suggests the support of Grinblat and his fraction.208 Andreev did not engage with the protesters, 
but entered the town hall through a back door. He later reacted, stating that he respected the 
rights of the picketers to express their opinion, but he also said that the decision to allow 
construction was the only legal option.209 A new action was planned for October 22, when the 
city was holding the event ‘The city of the future’ (Gorod budushchego) (mentioned in the 
previous chapter in the context of the AvtoVAZagregat issue), but a mass action was forbidden. 
Despite the ban, several protesters turned up with banners.210 
Grinblat and the Edinaya Rossiya fraction continued their political work against the 
destruction of green areas. On January 20, 2016, the town council adopted a new policy 
document for the protection of green areas, establishing a committee of local council members, 
representatives of the town districts and members of the local government. This committee 
would take decisions about the clearance of forest.211 However, the future of the two disputed 
plots was still unclear, and the protest continued. In April, inhabitants of the Komsomolskiy 
rayon appealed to governor Merkushkin to intervene. KPRF also held a rally against the 
clearing of town forest areas.212 
After April 2016, no more media reports about protests concerning the two sites could be 
found. It is unclear whether the two sites had been saved definitively, but the case clearly 
damaged the reputation of mayor Andreev, who had won the election with his promise to make 
the town a better place to live. In April 2017, he was replaced by Sergei Antashev, a member 
of Edinaya Rossiya.213 Although the policy regarding the clearance of forest was adopted, 
social media users are continuing to report about cases of forest clearing in different parts of 
the town.214 
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CHAPTER VI: ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT 
Although civil society in Russia is often simply labelled as weak, it has become clear that the 
actual situation is more complex. The context in which Russian civil society develops and 
operates is very different from that of the countries on which the concept was initially modelled, 
even though on the surface, the situation might seem comparable. Russia, like Western 
countries, has platforms for the interaction between state and civil organizations. However, we 
have seen that these platforms are often platforms in name only. The Civil Chamber of Samara 
is firmly under control of the government. The Tolyatti Tripartite Committee between 
companies, trade unions and local government is a Potemkin organization: we have seen that 
it did not play any role during the crisis in AvtoVAZ and AVA in 2015 and ’16. The official 
AvtoVAZ trade union, ASM, does not remotely resemble trade unions in the West. Analyzing 
these organizations as if they are simply weaker forms of equivalent structures in Western 
countries, therefore, makes little sense. To obtain a better understanding of the structures of 
civil society and interaction, it is necessary to go back to the three concepts of civil society that 
were described in the first chapter of this thesis. 
Maintaining the state of civility 
The first concept, of civil society as the state of civility, emphasizes that sovereign power is 
necessary to maintain the state of civility and guard ‘civil interests’. In Tolyatti, the state, by 
and large, does this by ‘keeping the lights on’: subsidizing the ailing car industry to make sure 
that the citizens have work and income. This approach works, since it answers to what 
AvtoVAZ workers in Tolyatti find most important: a stable income, and the pride of working 
at a factory that aroused nostalgic feelings of a glorious past. For many of the workers, this job 
security is already enough to refrain from protests. There is not much interaction in either of 
the three ‘realms’ (of associations, of ideologies, and of public discussion) Chebankova 
describes, but state and society keep each other in balance. 
The crisis around AvtoVAZagregat shows how fragile this balance really is. The 
government, attempting to improve the profitability of the company, brought AvtoVAZ under 
foreign management, which, according to market logic, cancelled a contract with one of 
AvtoVAZ’s suppliers. Workers, suddenly without work and income, have no real structures to 
express their discontent and come to an agreement with employers and the government, can 
only resort to rallies. In the broader fear of mass layoffs in AvtoVAZ, these rallies have the 
potential to gain momentum and become directed against the authorities in general. 
In the case of such a ‘disturbed balance’, the authorities can employ several tactics. The first 
option is to simply ignore or suppress the protest. This is the most effective option if the protests 
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have not yet gained much traction or media attention; after all, media reports about the 
suppression of workers who cannot feed their families could lead to further escalation. AVA 
workers managed to attract media attention at an early stage, which helped them to build 
momentum – however, even after the local KPRF department openly started supporting them, 
workers still were in danger of losing their jobs for attending rallies. 
The next tactic that the authorities can employ, is that of ‘red tape’. Representatives of the 
local government can plan meetings and then postpone them. The Prosecutor can accept legal 
cases but let them drag on for months. The government and the CEO of the plant can promise 
to have salaries paid within some time, only to break the promise. The purpose of such feet-
dragging is to exhaust protestors, who will then find ways to cope with the situation themselves: 
finding a job somewhere else, getting help from family members, or growing more vegetables 
at the dacha. The danger of this approach is, of course, that it can backfire if the situation is 
not resolved, as it makes the authorities seem complicit in the perceived injustice. 
The third tactic the authorities can apply, is blaming others and acting on that. A popular 
scapegoat are the Western sanctions, and in the case of AvtoVAZagregat, it was easy to find a 
target. The foreign management, personified by the despised CEO Bo Andersson was sharply 
criticized by Chemezov (even though he had expressed his support earlier), and was forced to 
step down. This approach rings a bell with workers, who, because of the Soviet legacy and 
state propaganda, are deeply suspicious of foreigners. This method, however, can also backfire 
when applied at the wrong occasion. As governor Merkushkin experienced, accusing jobless 
factory workers of being stirred up by foreign agents is not very credible. 
Maintaining the balance while minimizing interaction works for as long as either side is 
satisfied with the situation. If workers’ demands evolve beyond the desire for stability or the 
government cannot (or does not want to) pay the upkeep of the factory anymore, the balance is 
lost. Since there are no real official channels of interaction to resolve the issue, this can lead to 
crises to become acute very fast. 
The separate sphere and the lifeworld 
The second concept of civil society is that of a separate sphere, in which socialization, and 
mediation between the state and the private sphere (Hegel) take place, and the lifeworld 
(Habermas) is shaped. Here, too, we see that ‘the second Russia’ seems familiar, but in fact 
differs sharply from the experience in Western countries. As in the West, the Russian public 
sphere is a crowded place of trade unions, political parties, media and NGOs. However, 
whereas in Western countries, these organizations are the main actors in the process of 
communication and discussion that shapes the lifeworld, we see that this kind of interaction is 
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rare in Tolyatti’s civil society. Newspapers are mostly descriptive, sometimes form a platform 
to other actors, but rarely develop opinions. Official trade unions attempt to stimulate workers 
to put their efforts into the company, and be understanding in times of crisis. ‘Free’ trade 
unions, and KPRF, too, hammer down the demand for higher wages and social justice. Groups 
on VKontakte and Edinaya Rossiya stress the importance of city forests and stimulate tree 
planting. 
What does not, or rarely happen, however, is the development of opinions. The formulation 
of opinions on a policy to modernize Soviet-era industry to guarantee growth and employment 
in the future is not stimulated. Nature activists protest the clearance of forest and plant new 
trees, but an opinion forming process on how to develop the city while at the same time 
improving its livability does not take place. This striking underdevelopment of the public 
sphere is partially the result of the Soviet past: in the Soviet Union, the public sphere was 
completely suffocated by the state. However, it is just as well a result of the lack of interaction 
between those who have formal power to shape policy, and those who would benefit from such 
policy. 
The lifeworld of Tolyatti’s blue-collar workers, therefore, remains rooted in the values and 
ideals that were formed during the Soviet era: a stable job and fixed income, finding pride in 
the company they work for, and the support of one’s country against external threats. This is 
one of the pillars of the balance of civil stability, described above. It also guarantees the 
continuation of the nomenklatura, in which members give up economic and political freedom 
in exchange for ‘club goods’. The system is not continued due to the ignorance of ordinary 
citizens: on the contrary, Russian citizens are very much aware of the abundance of corruption 
and the limits on political freedom in their country. It is continued by the fact that the public 
sphere of Russia’s regions is too underdeveloped to allow the formulation of a credible 
alternative to the current situation. 
Could this situation change anytime soon? The most likely harbinger of change in this 
sphere is the phenomenon of weblogs. Although many of the local blogs do not yet transcend 
the level of the simple expression of indignation, experience on the national scale has shown 
that the potential is there. The clearest example of a blogger who successfully formulated key 
problems of contemporary Russia and formulated an alternative, is Alexei Navalny. It is very 
well thinkable that local bloggers will follow his example. 
Civil society as a state mechanism 
The third concept of civil society is that of social action and a state mechanism. As Tilly 
stated, a modern civil society in this sense pertains the existence of the formation of interest 
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groups that are mobilized to achieve a common goal. This contrasts with ‘reactive’ and 
‘competitive’ claims of community groups, which marked the pre-modern period. A modern 
civil society in this sense is useful for the state, since it is an external type of monitoring and 
coercion: a ‘fire alarm’ (McCubbins and Schwartz). Again, at first sight, Russia seems to have 
an abundance of interest groups, uniting people to pursue a common goal, such as political 
parties and trade unions. 
Some of these groups, indeed, do act as ‘fire alarms’ for the state – not against corruption, 
but against a possible escalation of a crisis. The actions of KPRF in the crisis around AvtoVAZ 
and AVA are a clear example: the discontent among workers was voiced by the party, which 
organized a rally that attracted more people than expected. The local and regional government, 
and later the head of Rostec, were forced to react on the situation before it would escalate even 
further. Apart from being a ‘fire alarm’, KPRF also functioned as a ‘pressure valve’: the party 
offered angry workers a legitimate way to express their discontent, albeit limited (when the 
protests tended to escalate, workers could still be fired for attending a rally). On the higher 
level, member of the State Duma Leonid Kalashnikov felt free enough to express explicit 
discontent with the political course of prime minister Medvedev. Direct criticism of president 
Putin, however, is taboo. 
However, KPRF, as part of the structural opposition and as such part of Russia’s political 
system, should be considered an exception: most civil society groups, such as the independent 
trade unions, do not get such freedom to express themselves. The formation of new, 
independent interest groups, for which social media often function as an incubator, is actively 
countered by system groups. In Tolyatti, this was clearly visible when an independent forest 
protection movement seemed to come into existence. State-related actors, such as Edinaya 
Rossiya, recruited the grassroots activists by organizing tree planting days and artificially 
stirring up ‘enthusiasm’ among citizens. Those activists who recognized the events as ‘fake’ 
left the sphere of civil action altogether. In this way, the formation of independent interest 
groups remains very difficult. Because of this, and due to the underdeveloped nature of the 
public sphere (as described above) much of the allowed civil action remains reactive. 
The case of Tolyatti’s forests shows what kind of civil society the Russian state prefers and 
tries to develop. Groups that organize tree planting days (but also groups that take care of 
elderly people, veterans, and organize humanitarian help) without criticizing government 
actions are stimulated and recruited by the government to take up those tasks the Russian state 
fails to perform. However, the pickets of 2015 against the clearing of city forests in Tolyatti 
also shows a different kind of civil society action: actions that are a reflection of factional 
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conflicts within the political elite. Although there was real discontent among citizens about the 
construction plans on a forest area, civil action received a boost because of the support of a 
political opponent of mayor Andreev. Although there was genuine anger, the fact that those 
protests could take place without being suppressed, gave away political discord, and plans to 
clear the way for a mayor of another faction. This, again, shows a phenomenon that, on the 
surface, seems similar to phenomena in Western countries, but in fact, is structurally different. 
Reflections on earlier research 
What do these insights add to the existing vast, but contradictory literature on Russian civil 
society? Professor Morjé Howard described the apprehension to commit to organizations, and 
the unfulfilled belief in ‘spontaneous’ improvements as important factors in the weakness of 
Russian civil society. This is an accurate observation, but it is more than a remnant of the Soviet 
past. More than twenty-five years after the demise of the Soviet Union, civil society 
organizations are, again, ‘fake’: they are organized by state actors, and many people participate 
in them ‘to tick the box’. Apprehension to participate in those organizations will therefore not 
disappear as memories of the Soviet past fade away over generations, but is likely to stay. The 
unfulfilled belief in ‘spontaneous’ improvements can be explained from the underdevelopment 
of the public sphere in the Habermasian sense. A firmer belief in the possibility of 
improvement, and possibly an increased motivation to engage in civic activity, is largely 
dependent on the development of civil society in this sense. 
Elena Chebankova sees two ‘phases’ of civil society: a private phase, characterized by 
withdrawal, and a public phase, characterized by active engagement. In my view, this ‘cycle’ 
is, in fact, an interplay between developments within the three concepts of civil society, the 
state reaction on these developments, and the economic situation. Changes in one field can 
bring about changes in another field: economic development makes citizens less content with 
the balance of the status quo, which inspires them to express their desires in (social) media. 
This can lead to communicational activity and opinion forming in the public sphere, which can 
inspire people to take civil action: a move into the public phase. Economic downturn can shift 
the public focus on survival and security. Government repression of the public sphere aborts 
the opinion-forming process, and state annexation of social action demotivates citizens: the 
start of a private phase. Samuel Greene’s observation that the nature of civil society reflects 
the nature of the state is accurate. State intervention in the public sphere influences the way 
citizens mobilize, or fail to mobilize. In addition, this case study of civil society in Tolyatti 
showed that the structure of the state and civil society, and their interaction, also shapes the 
actors.   
  
57 
 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has assessed Russian civil society by performing a case study on the city of Tolyatti, 
by combining different theoretical concepts of civil society with empirical research. What has 
become clear is that the combination of social, economic, and political factors in contemporary 
Russia shaped the public sphere in such a way, that civil society in this country is structurally 
different from civil society in the Western countries on which the concept is based. 
In the state of economic stagnation and the absence of reforms, blue-collar workers in the 
‘second Russia’ on the one side, and the government on the other side both regard the 
continuation of the existing state as being in their interests. The ruling elite wants to continue 
extracting rents, and blue-collar workers want to maintain stability, their jobs, and an income 
on which they can survive. This has led to a situation in which the Russian government needs 
to subsidize outdated industries to prevent them from going bankrupt. Although workers are 
aware of the ubiquitous corruption, they see the state as the upholder of order and civility. In 
the absence of real institutions for providing interaction between government and society, any 
civil action could quickly lead to a crisis – a situation which both parties want to avoid. This is 
one of the reasons that the level of civil action remains low. 
The low degree of civic interaction is one of the reasons that the ideological dimension of 
civil society is poorly developed. Although newspapers do, to a certain extent, perform the role 
of a platform for opinions, the limited degree of interaction prevents the development of a real 
public opinion. Censorship does play a role, but even if opinions of individuals are expressed 
in an uncensored way, they remain just that: opinions of individuals or parties. For the 
government, the underdevelopment of the public sphere is an important guarantee of its 
survival. 
When the balance is lost, as happened in the case of the bankruptcy of AvtoVAZagregat and 
the layoffs at AvtoVAZ, the lack of institutionalized means of interaction becomes a problem, 
and the only way in which workers can really interact with the government is by attracting 
media attention through rallies. In such cases, the balance turns out to be fragile: discontent 
among the population immediately takes the form of a crisis, and there is no perspective on a 
real solution. The government can employ different tactics to subdue the crisis. It can ignore 
or suppress the protests at the onset of an escalation. It can use ‘red tape’ to delay the escalation, 
exhausting protesters and hoping that they will find the solution for their problems themselves. 
To prevent the protests from becoming politicized, the government shift the blame on other 
actors. In the case of AvtoVAZ, blaming the foreign management of the company for the 
  
58 
 
rounds of layoffs was an effective method: the population, deeply suspicious of foreigners, was 
receptive to the government’s message. 
The behavior of the Communist Party in the crisis around the closing of AvtoVAZagregrat 
is interesting and paradoxical. On the one hand, KPRF is part of the ‘structural opposition’, 
and in this sense part of the Russian system of government. On the other hand, we have seen 
that in Tolyatti, KPRF not only supported the protests, but even organized rallies itself. This 
paradox of organizing protests while at the same time being part of a system that discourages 
state-society interaction can be explained in different ways. First, KPRF has a function of a 
‘fire alarm’ and ‘pressure valve’ for the authorities. It can attract the attention of the national 
and regional authorities to the developing crisis, and prompt them to react. It also gives 
unhappy workers a possibility to express their anger, without being a danger to the system. 
Although KPRF sometimes voices criticism towards the government, the party does not 
question the legitimacy of the system, and Putin is not the subject of criticism. KPRF also 
functions as one of the parties that ‘fill up’ the associational and ideological spheres 
(Chebankova’s first and second ‘realms’) of civil society. By ‘adopting’ the protests, the party 
prevents that non-system actors or new organizations that are more difficult to control become 
active. A third explanation could be factionalism on the local level, also genuine concerns of 
local KPRF members, such as Alexei Krasnov, as they are confronted with the suffering of 
workers in their own town. 
Apart from minimizing interaction between state and society in non-crisis times, the 
government actively tries to ‘fill up’ the associational and ideological spheres of civil society. 
The study of the actions in protection of the forest in Tolyatti has shown this in two different 
instances. After the fires, there was a development of informal networks of active citizens, who 
wanted to restore and protect the forests. However, companies and state actors started 
organizing their own ‘tree planting days’, artificially stirring up enthusiasm by coercing people 
into taking part in these events. In this way, part of the genuinely active citizens was recruited 
by the state. Other activists, who recognized the enthusiasm as artificial, became disillusioned 
and turned their back on civil activity altogether. The second case in which we saw state actors 
filling up the civil society space, was that of demonstrations against the clearing of forests. 
Although some citizens were genuinely concerned about the building plans, the main cause of 
the demonstrations was, in fact, a factional conflict between the mayor of Tolyatti (an 
independent) and members of the Edinaya Rossiya party. In both instances, what at first sight 
looks like signs of civic activity, is in fact the result of the activity of actors that cannot really 
be considered part of civil society. 
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The activity of non-society actors in the civil society space is one of the explanations for the 
paradox posed in the introduction, that civil society at times appears very weak, and at other 
times appears strong. Chebankova described the flurry of activity in support of the Donbas 
region as a sign of a revival of civil society. However, this phenomenon resembles the artificial, 
state-organized activity that we saw in Tolyatti regarding the protection of forest, rather than 
genuine civic activity. It is important that researchers distinguish between state-organized ‘civil 
society’ and genuine civil society, even though the division is often vague. The second cause 
of the paradoxical state of civil society in Russia, is that the country lacks real institutionalized 
platforms for interaction between state and society. This means that lingering discontent within 
society remains hidden for a long time. When a crisis develops, people try to attract media 
attention, hoping that this will eventually resolve the situation. This suddenly makes them very 
visible. However, this visibility should not be mistaken for strength: in the case of the 
demonstrations of AvtoVAZ and AVA workers, by far the strongest actor was KPRF: a system 
actor. Larina’s ‘Workers’ Initiative Group AvtoVAZagretat’ more closely resembles a real civil 
society actor, but, as the name suggests, this group was only formed for a specific occasion, 
and it is unlikely to continue to exist long after the bankruptcy of AVA. 
There are several ways in which civil society could develop in future years. One is a 
development of the public sphere in the Habermasian sense, despite increasing government 
oppression. One of the most likely harbingers of change is the online sphere of blogs and social 
media. These means of communication in the public sphere are more difficult to curb than 
traditional media. It is possible that the example set by Navalny is followed by other local 
bloggers, which could lead to a modernization of civil society (as theorized by Charles Tilly) 
and more genuine civic action. Another possible development could be an increase in worker 
protests due to a decrease in living standards and job security. If this development is not 
combined with modernization of the public sphere, these labor protests will be like the ones we 
saw in Tolyatti: very visible, but without clear-cut goals or direction. However, if these two 
developments occur simultaneously, new forms of civil society and civic action could grow. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to remain careful, as the authorities can employ a range of 
methods to suppress or slow down these developments. If the government is successful in 
maintaining, and if necessary restoring, the existing balance within society, it is possible that 
the current system will remain in place for the foreseeable future. 
Russian civil society often seemingly resembles Western civil society, but is very different. 
But it goes too far to describe the system in general as ‘fake’. Its actors are real people, acting 
with their own motivations: the independent mayor who envisioned great improvement, but 
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underestimated the preferences of the citizens; the communist who went on a hunger strike and 
emotionally expressed his dismay about the suffering of AVA’s workers; the activists who 
want to improve their city by planting trees after the fires of 2010. However, the peculiarities 
of Russia’s political system, economic situation and social conditions greatly influence the 
methods they choose and the achievements they make. As conditions are never stable, Russian 
civil society, however underdeveloped it may be, does have significant potential for bringing 
about change. 
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